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MANETs are attractive technology in providing communication in the absence of a fixed infrastructure 
for applications such as, first responders at a disaster site or soldiers in a battlefield (Kumar, and 
Mishra, 2012). The rapid growth MANET has experienced in recent years is due to its Ad Hoc 
capabilities that have also made it prime target of cybercrimes (Jhaveri, 2012). This has raised the 
question of how could we embrace the benefits of MANET without the increased security risks. 
MANETs have several vulnerabilities such as lack of a central point, mobility, wireless links, limited 
energy resources, a lack of clear line of defence, cooperative nature and non-secure communication to 
mention a few.   
 
This research proposes a two-phase scheme. In phase-one a novel approach is suggested by using 
concept of exiting trust schemes and adopting the use of Dynamic Trust Threshold Scheme (DTTS) for 
the selection of trusted nodes in the network and using mutual trust acknowledgement scheme of 
neighbour nodes to authenticate two communicating nodes. The notion of trust is used for 
authenticating peer nodes. The trust scheme algorithm is based on real time network dynamics, relevant 
to MANET conditions, as opposed to pre-determined static values. The phase-one is implemented in 
AODV and tested in a simulated environment using NS2. The reason for using AODV is that it’s 
reactive and has comparatively low routing overhead, low energy consumption and relatively better 
performance (Morshed, et al 2010). In order to ensure data confidentiality and end-to-end security, in 
phase-two, the source and destination generates a shared secret key to communicate with each other 
using a highly efficient Diffie Hellman Elliptic Curve scheme (Wang, Ramamurthy and Zou, 2006). 









    As the number of mobile devices and wireless network users are continuously growing and the 
capacity of mobile computer increases, the need for unlimited networking is expected to rise. Easy and 
quick deployment of wireless networks highlights the significance and importance of MANET 
networks in future of wireless networks, which is not possible with the existing structure of current 
centralised wireless systems (Kumar, and Mishra, 2012). A MANET is a collection of autonomous 
nodes or terminals that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop, dynamic and purpose 
specific radio network that maintains connectivity in a decentralised manner (Sun, 2001). The 
decentralised architecture and dynamic topology of these networks allow the nodes to join and leave 
network at any point of time, as the nodes move or adjust their transmission and reception parameters. 
A MANET is deployed in a situation where the normal infrastructure network connections are not 
available in a given geographical area. MANETs can be used in military to communicate between 
soldiers, vehicles and military headquarters. It is also used in emergency and rescue services such as 
flood, fire and earthquake. It is widely used in location aware and educational services (Raja and Baboo 
2014). 
   
A MANET is more vulnerable to security attacks than conventional wired and wireless networks due to 
its distinct characteristics such as dynamic topology, open medium, no centralised access points, 
distributed cooperation and lack of association. Both authorised and malicious nodes can access the 
network. As a result, the network is prone to any form of security attacks from both inside and outside. 






nodes. Current standard MANET routing protocols do not focus much on the security and privacy 
issues such as Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Availability (Sharma and Chauhan, 2015). 
Routing in MANET is based on mutual trust between the nodes but the lack of centralised mechanism 
prevents the use of conventional security techniques. To complicate matter further, various limitations 
of nodes such as power and bandwidth constraints, frequent disconnection of links and short battery life 
poses an important challenge in implementing cryptographic algorithms for providing the required 
essential security. Nodes having low energy can partially or drop all packets to conserve energy. If a 
node spends very large part of its battery power then it may not be available (Gupta, and Sexena, 
2010). 
 
Security has always been a concern in wireless networks but due to the nature of MANETs, it presents 
new challenges to security design. Ad-hoc networks are dynamically formed amongst a group of 
wireless users and do not require a fixed network infrastructure (no central administrator) or pre-
configuration (Liang, Poor and Ying, 2011). Nodes function as a router and rely on neighbours to 
communicate and relay messages if not within the same communication range (Perkins, Belding-Royer 
and Das, 2003). This fast changing topology and other vulnerabilities make it essential to provide 
security in such networks at each individual node. As every node functions as a router and do not reside 
in physically protected places and wireless channel is accessible to all nodes, both legitimate users and 
malicious attacks therefore, can easily fall under attack (Annarasi and Sevanesh, 2014). Also, the lack 
of well-defined place, traffic monitoring and access control mechanism cannot be deployed. Open peer-
to-peer network architecture, shared wireless medium, limited resources and highly dynamic topology 







The level of trust will be represented as the belief probability varying form 0 (not trusted) to 1 (fully 
trusted) as described in (Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011). According to (Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011), 
trust is dynamic and not static because the nodes are mobile and the network dynamics change rapidly 
and as elaborated further by the same author, that due to dynamicity of trust, trust should be expressed 
as a continuous variable. This led us to our motivation for attempting to devise a method that calculates 
trust in a dynamic fashion rather than a relying on a static value.  
 
In order to address some of these security challenges; a two phased solution is proposed that is based 
on taking pure MANET features into account (Nikander, Kempf and Nordmark, 2004). In phase-one a 
novel approach is suggested by using the following two steps: 
 
1. Developing a Dynamic Trust Threshold Scheme (DTTS) for the selection of trusted nodes in the 
network by adopting existing trusted scheme (Khan et al, 2014).  
 
2. Using dynamic trust to authenticate two communicating nodes known as mutual authentication 
scheme 
 
In this phase (phase-one), a trust-based model framework is proposed that provides the foundation for 
authenticating nodes without having any prior trust relationship. The trust model is highly adaptive and 
responds to network changes in real time. It will allow all nodes to calculate the trust of neighbour 
nodes by taking their specific parameters into account. Therefore, the proposed trust model is dynamic 






are used to calculate the dynamic trust values and this has a direct relationship with MANET 
operations. 
 
In an attempt to provide end-to-end security solution, a novel method referred to a mutual 
authentication scheme is introduced in this thesis. Authentication is one of the main principal for 
security in any system and in order to implement it in a pure MANET environment, it can present a 
great challenge. The scheme can be used as supplement to existing authentication schemes. Various 
cryptographic techniques could be applied to this scheme in variety of ways. The mutual authentication 
can be a topic for further research and explored to enhance authentication process in MANET.  
 
The proposed Dynamic Trust model will be applied in the following way to achieve mutual 
authentication and its performance will be tested in a simulated environment. Once, the dynamic trust 
is established in all nodes, then the source and destination nodes request each other’s trust values from 
its corresponding one-hop neighbours. The source node S prior to sending any data will request the 
trust value of the destination node (D) from D’s one-hop neighbour to authenticate D and verify its 
trust. Destination will repeat the same authentication process for the source S to get the updated trust 
values from its neighbours.  
 
Phase-two is mainly concerned with applying cryptographic techniques (Wang, Ramamurthy, and Zou, 
2006; Koblitz, 1987), to ensure confidentiality through encrypting data between peer nodes. This is the 
last step of the scheme in which an efficient key exchange solution to encrypt data is demonstrated. 






The cryptographic schemes that are implemented at this stage are state-of-the-art and one that can 
provide maximum efficiency given the specific features of MANET.  
 
The algorithm will be simulated and analysed using Network Simulator NS2.33. Linux Ubuntu version 
16.04 is used, as NS2 is open source and its Linux based. The scheme will be tested and analysed by 
introducing malicious nodes in network using AODV protocol to detect and isolate such nodes. 
Various tests will be conducted to validate that the scheme can mitigate against Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks such as Blackhole (Jhaveri, 2012) and Wormhole (Anju and Sminesh, 2014). The 
simulation will be generated under varying network conditions such as mobility, network size area, 
simulation time, data rate and node count using standard AODV as a reference to compare it with the 
proposed trusted scheme. At the end, the results will be analysed to evaluate standard AODV 
performance against trusted AODV in terms of security. The performance metrics tested will be 
throughput, routing overhead, packet statics, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay. 
 
 
 1.1 Statement of the problem 
 
There are inherent security weaknesses and vulnerabilities in MANETs. The cooperative nature and 
self-organising capability of MANET, makes it considerably challenging to build trust between nodes. 
Trust of a particular node can be perceived from a perspective of peer node on reliability and accuracy 
of information received from nodes while traversing the network (Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011). Trust 
measurement in MANET can pose a considerable challenge due to the nodes power constrains, 






complicated given the limitation of the MANET environment and if achieved then the node and 
network will be deemed highly trusted and secure. The trust computation in static network is relatively 
simple as they are more behaviour oriented and could be predicted when they are closely observed 
(Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011).  
 
A Trust based or reputation based system could be referred to one that discovers , records and utilises 
reputation to form trust threshold and uses trust to influence the foundation for the security scheme to 
be implemented and provide a multilayer complete security system for the whole network (Cho, Swami 
and Chen, 2011). The results obtained from the Dynamic Trust Threshold scheme are used to make 
guided and reputation based decisions about the network, its topology, dynamics and identifying most 
eligible nodes. The Dynamic Trust Threshold scheme can be seen in isolation or a seamless self-
configured security system that provides security solution for routing and data communication. The 
scheme not only provides the capability to make well informed decisions but reinforces the security 
against any internal attacks in case of any breach. This thesis proposes a trust based algorithm to 
support secure communication between nodes and protect against various threats. The requirement and 
aim for the thesis is to achieve the security goal of Availability, Integrity, Authenticity, and Non-
repudiation (Mohandas, Silas and Sam, 2013). This can only be achieved by forming a secure channel 
between the communicating nodes. The algorithm used, is a combination of a dynamic trust threshold 
and available efficient cryptographic techniques to achieve the above security goals. The scheme is 
divided into two phases. The first phase of the algorithm is to build the trust factors which provide a 
secure platform for the later phase known as phase-two of the proposed scheme, which is the 







The dynamic trust algorithm integrates the trust protocol and security attributes of nodes functioning as 
routers to provide an integrated security metric for the whole network. In MANET the nodes are fully 
cooperative and rely on each other for routing and message forwarding. The formation of trust between 
the nodes is a primary goal as it plays a vital role in securing communication (Cho, Swami and Chen, 
2011). The continuous evaluation, of a node performance to calculate trust, is needed to reflect the 
changes in trust level of nodes. The cryptographic operations are performed, once the trust level is 
achieved. To securely process data, secret key generation techniques and the cryptographic operations 
are performed to provide authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation, once the desired trust 
threshold is achieved by a specific node (Zhao, et al 2012).. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
This research endeavours to find a solution to the following main questions: 
 
 How to provide pre-authentication between nodes in dynamic and unsecure wireless Adhoc 
environment when nodes communicate for the first time. 
 
 How to provide confidentiality to the data being exchange between nodes. 
 
 How can these solutions are provided without using unconventional security methods.  
 






Authentication requires how to validate peer nodes and confidentiality requires cryptographic keys 
exchange (Sharma and Chauhan, 2015). This research is based on finding answers to the above 
research questions by integrating mutual trust mechanism using AODV routing protocol, which will 
provide foundation for a trusted framework and devise scheme for a generating a share secret key 
mechanism that is tailored specifically to MANET environment (Zhao et al, 2012).. 
 
1.3 Research Aims  
 
 The aim of this research is to find a solution to the research questions outlined in section 1.2 
and to put in place appropriate countermeasures to mitigate threats against the above mentioned 
vulnerabilities.  
 
 To provide solutions to the security challenges faced by MANET using tailored and efficient 
cryptographic techniques. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
Following are the steps needed to achieve the research aim: 
 







2. Define and measure network specific metrics. Design a mathematical model that could calculate 
trust in nodes based on dynamic trust threshold values. 
 
3. Using various cryptographic techniques and the above metrics as basis to implement security in 
the network. 
 
4. Final step is testing, analyzing and evaluation of the trusted scheme.  
 
1.5 Research Process 
 
To achieve the above aims and objectives, the following steps are used to conduct a detailed research 
and design and implement the model. 
 
Step 1: Literature Review 
 
To conduct a detailed study of wireless and mobile Adhoc networks, given the specific infrastructure of 
MANE T and its mobile and highly dynamic architecture. The aim is to thoroughly study its full details, 
design a workable solution that suits this type of network. Part of this study is to learn about different 









Step 2: Security Challenges  
 
The aim is to research the conventional methods of how security is applied in infrastructure networks 
and how those techniques could be tailored and applied in MANET. A full analysis of the 
vulnerabilities and security challenges faced by MANET is then considered. A detailed study will then 
consider the other features of MANETs, such as the type of protocols, types of wireless 
communications and forms of security attacks.  
 
Step 3: Encryption Scheme 
 
Cryptography is essential part of security in any network hence; a detailed study of the cryptographic 
methods considers a security scheme based on Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication normally 
referred to as CIA (Zhao et al, 2012). To ensure data integrity and confidentiality various encryption 
techniques will be tested and implemented. Encryption involves the use to different types of symmetric 
and asymmetric key techniques that could be implemented in MANET environment. A study and test is 
then carried out to use the most efficient encryption algorithm to ensure security but not at the expense 
of performance.  
 
Step 4: Dynamic Trust Threshold 
 
Various parameters that play a vital role in how MANET operates are considered in this work. These 






the basic building block of dynamic trust scheme (Khan et al, 2015). This will provide the foundation 
for the basic layer of security in the form of trusted and untrusted nodes.  
Step 5: Design analytical model 
 
There is a need to design a new algorithm as existing protocols designed for static LAN and WAN have 
no such schemes implemented. The aim is to design a scheme using AODV. The AODV protocol is 
modified to implement the proposed scheme and the standard AODV is used as reference to compare 
and validate the proposed scheme. Details such as the formulas and various equations used in the 
scheme will also be explained. 
 
Step 6: Trust Based Scheme Design 
 
Trust based algorithm will be researched and will provide a platform for the Dynamic Trust Threshold 
scheme. This is the first step towards a multi-layered approach to provide security in MANET. Part of 
our literature review is to thoroughly review the trust based schemes designs so far by different 
researchers. The aim is to design a scheme by taking into account and adapt methods that best suit the 
trust scheme. 
 
Step 7: Implementation and testing 
 
In this stage NS2 is used to test and examine the performance of algorithm. NS2 is an open source 
simulation tool and is Linux based. NS2 supports C++ and TCL programming language (Henderson 






implement the proposed scheme. An advanced level understanding of a Linux operating system such as 
Ubuntu is also needed to fully utilize the simulation environment. This step also includes the testing of 
the proposed scheme, which involves debugging and troubleshooting, programming and design issues.  
A few additional steps have been included to AODV code to implement the trusted scheme. Also, some 
modifications to packet header of hello-packets have been made to exchange the trust and parameters 
information (Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). 
 
Step 8: Results analysis 
 
Once, the trust scheme is implemented using AODV, the next step is to test the scheme by comparing 
its performance with standard AODV under varying conditions. This is an important step, as it will 
prove how the proposed trusted AODV is performing against the standard AODV and this will be used 
as reference. The performance will be tested using various parameters, packets statistics and network 
conditions such as the number of nodes, mobility, scalability, simulation time, area and number of 
malicious nodes. The performance will be tested using the following metrics:  
 
 Throughput:  It is the amount of data (bit or packets) per period of time (seconds). 
  
 Routing Overhead: Routing overhead represents any control packets required by protocol to 







 Average End-to-end Delay: It is the average time taken by packet to reach from source to the 
destination. 
 
 Packet Delivery Ratio: The ratio at which packets are delivered in the network. 
 
Step 9: Modifications 
 
This stage involves testing and optimization for further improvement in algorithm. This is about 
modification needed after a rigorous process of testing and analysing the results. This is an on-going 
process until the protocol is successful in achieving the objectives. 
 
Step 10: Thesis Write Up 
 





































      Figure 1.1 Research Process 
 
 
Step 1: Literatures Review 
Step 3: Encryption Schemes 
 
Step 7: Implementation and testing 
Step 8: Result Analysis and evaluation  
Step 9: Modification / 
improve performance 
Step 10: PhD thesis write-up 
Step 4: Dynamic Trust Threshold 
 
Step 2: Security Challenges 
Step 5: Design Analytical Model 






1.6 Thesis Organisation 
 
Chapter 2 covers the background information, the history and previous research that have been 
conducted on MANET. A detailed overview of how MANET works; its features and its importance in 
the modern day research is presented. The security aspect of MANET is then discussed in detail. The 
conventional security techniques and schemes those can be applicable to MANET. Cryptographic 
schemes that can be applied in MANET are also discussed. Lastly, the trust based schemes and other 
security schemes that have already been implemented in MANET are explored.   
 
Chapter 3 is about the importance of authentication and different ways it can be implemented in 
especially in MANET. Different methods are discussed that are adapted to authenticate nodes using 
trust in pre and post network initialisation and its advantages and disadvantages. Also, a brief 
deliberation over various ways of the trust establishment is presented. Once, a certain level of trust is 
obtained and nodes are authenticated, how the key management protocols can be implemented is also 
discussed in this chapter. Lastly, the reason for the selection for choosing the parameters needed to 
dynamically calculate trust threshold are discussed. 
 
In chapter 4, the mathematical model of the scheme has been discussed including the details of the 
protocol design stages and specifications involved in designing the algorithm are presented. The 
equations used to implement the scheme in NS2 are also discussed in detail. The parameters used to 







Chapter 5 is about how the trust based scheme is implemented. The simulation tool NS2, which is used 
to implement the scheme is discussed. The benefits and reasons for its selection are also discussed. 
How simulation environment is setup, mobility and energy models is selected and implemented, 
malicious nodes and the modified hello packets used to carry the trust parameters are discussed. 
 
Chapter 6 is about the performance evaluation of the trusted scheme. The performance parameters and 
various scenarios used to test the scheme are presented. The results are shown and analysed in detail to 
show the performance of AODV using the dynamic trust scheme as compared to the standard AODV. 
The numerical model is shown to prove, how the proposed scheme can reduce false positives. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by presenting the final conclusion. The proposed scheme is critically 
analysed and future work are discussed in this chapter. The thesis summary, contribution and the 
















Background and Literature Review 
 
  In this section, the history, background information and previous work been done on MANETs is 
analysed. MANET is a wireless network of mobile nodes which is self-organized. Every node can 
function as a router and communicate with another node thus; it is also called a multi-hop network. The 
early MANET projects were driven by the military for communication in places with no infrastructure 
available and there was a need to setup fast and easy networks (Sun, 2001). In those days flooding 
approach was adopted instead of multi-hop routing. As the basic routing and efficiency in terms of 
communication were achieved, there arose the need for security. As no provisions for security were 
taken into account at the time of the development of routing protocol, therefore the protocols were not 
designed with security of the network embedded (Jhaveri, 2012). Hence, the main focus of the research 
was diverted towards implementing security solutions.  
 
The research on MANET was initialised by Defence Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) in 
the late 70s, and was called PRNET packet radio network, (Kahn et al, 1978). This research was 
initiated to provide communication between computers and urbanized PRNET. The PRNET then 
evolved into Survivable Adaptive Radio Network (SUARN), (Kumar and Mishra, 2012). Since the 
increase in Adhoc network in commercial and domestic areas in the form of PDAs, laptops and pocket 
PCs. This surge resulted in the increased need for information exchange as well. The importance of 
Adhoc networking became even greater with the emergence of wireless technologies, such as IEEE 
802.11, Bluetooth and HIPERLANE (Xu, Hischke and Walke, 2003). The functioning group of 






2.1 Wireless communication in MANET 
 
There are various wireless communication technologies used in MANET. Most common are IEEE 
802.11, ZigBee 802.15.4 and Bluetooth. These are discussed in detail, in the following section; 
 
 IEEE 802.11:  
In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) created the first wireless local 
area network (WLAN) standard.  It is a set of physical layer (PHY) and media access control (MAC) 
specification for implementing WLAN computer communication in 900 MHz, (IEEE 802.11, no date). 
They are created and maintained by IEEE (IEEE 802.11, no date). Due to the low speed of 2Mb in 
802.11, the IEEE expanded the original standard creating 802.11b, 802.11g, 802.11a, 802.11n and on. 
This is the one of the common wireless technology used in MANET communication. 
 
 ZigBee 802.15.4:  
It is an IEEE 802.15.4 based specification that is packet-based radio protocol intended for low-cost, 
battery operated devices (IEEE 802.15, no date). Some of the features include support for multiple 
network topologies, low latency and low duty cycles to provide long duty cycles. 
 
 Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1: 
It uses low-powered radio communication to link phones, PDA’s and computers wirelessly. It is 






was developed as an alternative wireless network technology with a relatively short range of 
approximately 10 meters and bandwidth of 1-3 Mbps (Rashid and Yusoff, 2006). 
 
As Radio Frequency RF is used as medium of communication in MANET therefore, it inherits all the 
properties and characteristics of wireless networks such as the wireless channel security threats and 
wireless medium unreliability compared to wired network. The routing protocols developed for 
MANET then replaced the broadcast approaches, which were more efficient and robust. But yet 
another great challenge faced was securing the network from both passive and active attacks (Jhaveri, 
2012; Rifquddin and Sukiswo, 2015). The routing protocols developed for MANET did not take 
security aspect of the network into consideration. The protocols were geared towards efficiency and 
speed. Therefore, the researcher drew their attention towards developing an efficient as well as secure 
protocol, one that require minimum resources and provide maximum security. There has been various 
protocol developed to address the security issue in MANET. Various security algorithms have been 
proposed by implementing various cryptographic techniques, considering the conditions of MANET, 
by different researchers. Some of them include SAODV (Juwad and Al-Raweshidy, 2008), SEAD (Hu, 
John and Perrig, 2002; Yu and Su 2009), TESLA (Perrig, Canetti and Song, 2002; Yu and Su, 2009), 
ARIADNE (Hu, Perrig and Johnson, 2005), SAR (Yi, Naldrug and Kravets, 2005), Security Aided 
Adhoc Routing (Carter and Yasinsac, 2002) and ARAN (ARAN, no date; Yu and Su, 2009). All the 
above protocols used various types of cryptographic techniques such as secret key, private key and 







In the next section, we will elaborate on the different aspects of MANET functionality, routing 
protocols and security. 
 
2.2 MANET Infrastructure 
 
MANET is self-organising wireless mobile network; therefore, their protocols are designed taking into 
account the dynamic connection, with no centralized structure. All nodes behave as a router and take 
part in discovery and maintenance of routes to other nodes in the network (Kumar, M. and Mishra, S. 
2012). Wireless networks are classified into two types: 
 
2.2.1 Infrastructure Mode 
 
Infrastructure mode uses a central device called a wireless access point. The access point is used to 
connect wireless nodes to an Ethernet network.  
 
2.2.2 Ad Hoc Mode 
 
Adhoc network is the aggregation of mobile nodes, communicating without any centralized mechanism 
and are also referred to as infrastructure-less network. The Adhoc capability comes at the cost of 
memory, computation power and limited battery power. The larger the network becomes with more 
nodes adding, it requires greater processing power, larger memory and bandwidth to maintain accurate 









Figure 2.1 Types of Wireless Networks 
 
 
2.3 MANET Routing 
 
A wide variety of MANET protocols have been developed by researchers to meet the routing and 
mobility challenges. The protocols for MANET can be classified into three categories i.e. proactive, 
reactive and hybrid (Kumar and Mishra, 2012). Figure 2.2 shows the classification and types of routing 








                                                 Figure 2.2 Routing Protocols in MANET  
 
 
2.3.1 Proactive Routing Protocol 
 
These types of protocols are table driven where each node maintains one or more table containing 
routing information to every other node. The table is updated periodically to maintain the up to date 
view of the network. The nodes are updated when there is a topology change. Proactive protocols can 
be distance-vector or link state (Mohandas, G., Silas, S. and Sam, S. 2013).  
 
In distance-vector protocols the routing information is only exchanged between directly connected 







In contrast, the Link-State that is the second type of the proactive protocol where all nodes know about 
the path reachable by all other nodes. Each node has information about its neighbours and obtains other 
topology information about the network from broadcast messages it receives from other nodes. 
Optimized Link State Routing OLSR (Singh and Verma, 2015), Destination-Sequenced Distance-
Vector routing protocol DSDV (Gupta and Kumar, 2015; Yu and Su, 2009) and Wireless Routing 
Protocol WRP (Murthy and Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 1996) are some of the example of proactive routing 
protocols. A brief overview of these protocols is presented in the following section: 
 
DSDV Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol (DSDV) (Gupta and Kumar, 2015) 
require all the nodes to send full routing updates. Therefore, every node maintains a routing table that 
contains the details of neighbours and also details of the routes to all other destinations. It uses 
Bellman-Ford routing algorithm to calculate routes (Gupta and Kumar, 2015). This protocol is a 
modified version of Destination Vector Routing DVR and was originally discovered by C. Perkins and 
P. Bhagwat in 1994 (Singh and Verma, 2015). 
 
WRP Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) (Murthy and Garcia-Luna-Aceves, 1996) is another table-
driven protocol. Every node in WRP protocol maintains a routing table, a link-cost table and message 
retransmission list. Nodes get updated periodically as well as when there is a topology change. Nodes 
exchange routing table with their neighbour when a new path is found and always update its routing 







OLSR Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) is proactive protocol that has routes available when ever 
required. The protocol declares a dedicated node as Multi-Point Relay MPR and only these nodes are 
able to broadcast data. This forms a key part of the protocol which also has the advantage of reducing 
the traffic to entire network (Sing and Verma, 2015). 
  
 2.3.2 Reactive Routing Protocol  
 
These types of protocols take a reactive approach as opposed to table drive. The routes are generated as 
and when required by the communicating nodes. These routes remain valid until the destination is 
reachable or the route is no longer needed (Mohandas, G., Silas, S. and Sam, S. 2013).  Both types of 
protocols come with their own advantages which will be discussed in later section. Types of reactive 
protocols and their brief explanation are discussed in the later section. Several protocols are going 
through IETF standardization, some of them will be discussed in this section.   
 
Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E. and Das, S. (2003) Adhoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is one 
of reactive protocol that initiates the process of route discovery when the packet needs to be sent. As 
there is no route known prior to request to the destination therefore, the protocol initiates the process of 
route discovery. The routing messages do not contain information about the whole path but only the 
source and destination information is held. Whenever, a node needs to send a packet to another node, it 
broadcasts a Route Request RREQ message. Each node that receives a broadcast, sets up a reverse 
route towards the originator of the message i.e. source node. Once the destination is reached, the 
destination node sends a Route Reply RREP message. It uses destination sequence number to identify 







DSR Dynamic Source Routing DSR is another type of reactive protocol that saves bandwidth by 
restricting the use of control packets. The two main phases of this protocol is route discovery and route 
maintenance. The major difference between the two phases is that the later does not require periodic 
hello transmission i.e. its beacon-less (Gupta and Kumar, 2015; Chai-Keong, 1996). 
 
2.3.3 Hybrid Routing Protocol 
 
Hybrid combines features from both reactive and proactive protocols. The aim is to make it more 
efficient. Some types of Hybrid protocols are Temporary Ordered Routing Algorithm TORA (Murthy 
and Garcia-Luna-Aceves 1996) and Zone Routing Protocol ZRP (Hass, Pealman and Samar, 2003). 
Some explanations of theses protocols is given in the next section. TORA Temporary Ordered Routing 
Algorithm aims to be more efficient by reducing the control messages to minimize the communication 
overhead. The nodes only have information about neighbour i.e. one-hop. It maintains the state, on the 
destination basis, like distance vector protocols and its destination oriented nature represents its 
reactive nature thus, it is known as hybrid (Murthy and Garcia-Luna-Aceves 1996).  
 
ZRP Zone Routing Protocol (Hass, Pealman and Samar, 2003) combines the best of both reactive and 
proactive routing protocols. As the names suggests, it is based on the concept of zones.  It reduces 
initial route discovery delays by employing reactive routing and control traffic by using proactive 






zone where the maintenance of routing information is easier. For furthest nodes it uses a reactive 
approach. 
 
2.4 MANET Security 
 
Security is protecting systems, networks, programs and other assets from any digital attacks. As the 
attacks constantly evolve therefore, they need to be identified and mitigated. Common network is 
exposed to different types of security attacks. These security attacks can be aimed accessing, tempering 
or destroying sensitive information. The most common forms of security threats that are faced today 
are as follows: 
 
 Malware 
It is piece of software that runs like any other software and the key difference is in the behavior. 
A piece of software is considered as malicious, if it shows activities like replicating, disabling 
certain security feature, data stealing etc., then it can be considered as malware (Shaid and 
Maarof (2014).  
 
 Phishing 
It is a type of social engineering attack in which various methods are used to fool people into 
disclosing their sensitive information. The common types of phishing attack are spoofed emails, 







 Denial-of-Service (DOS) 
This is the type of attack, where a legitimate user is denied access to the information. Some of 
the types are Blackhole (Jhaveri, 2012), Wormhole (Anju and Sminesh, 2014) are classed as 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Other types of attacks are Byzantine (Yu and Su, 2009), 
Rushing (Sukiswo and Rifquddin, 2015). 
 
 Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) 
It is when an attacker place themselves inline between two devices or people that are 
communicating. The intention is to manipulate the data as it traverse between the 
communicating parties (Xu and Liu, 2017). 
 
 Brute Force Password attack 
This is one of the most widespread types of attacks in computer networks. In this type of the 
attack, the attacker continues trying different passwords on the target machine in an attempt ot 
reveal the loin password (Najafabadi et al 2014).  
 
2.4.2 Forms of Attacks in MANET 
 
The attacks in MANET are of two types; internal or external attacks. These attacks can be further 








 Internal vs. External Attacks 
Internal attack also called insider attack comes from the compromised node that belongs to the network 
and might feed other nodes with incorrect information. External attack can be in the form of an 
adversary injecting harmful information into the network. This type of attack is normally launched by 
the node that is not part of the network (Meddeb, et al 2017).  
 
 Active vs. Passive Attacks 
 Active type of attack comes with the aim of a node damaging other nodes by performing harmful 
operations such as network outage, information interruption, modification or fabrication and disrupting 
the whole functionality of the network. Examples of active attacks are DoS, spoofing, replying, 
jamming and modification. Passive attacks on the other hand, obtain data exchanged in the network 
without disrupting the network operations. Examples of passive attacks are traffic monitoring, 
eavesdropping and traffic analysis (Liang, Y., Poor, H. V. and Ying, L. 2011). 
 
2.4.3 Security Threats in Manet 
 
Routing protocol in MANETs such as AODV, were designed without taking security considerations 
into account therefore, it is prone to number of security threats as mentioned earlier. There are number 
of attacks that has been identified and studied in MANET. The types of attacks also depend on which 
and what type of network has been targeted. We will discuss more advanced attacks that could affect 
MANET. Some of the types are Blackhole (Jhaveri, 2012), Wormhole (Anju and Sminesh, 2014) are 






Rushing (Sukiswo and Rifquddin, 2015), Grayhole (Jhaveri, 2012), Resource consumption (Yu and Su, 
2009), and Flooding (Sukiswo and Rifquddin, 2015). 
 
 Blackhole Attack: 
 
A malicious node absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets in Blackhole attack. The attacker 
node drops packets destined for other nodes. Thus, denying services to legitimate nodes in the network. 
When a malicious node receives a RREQ packet from another node, it sends a false route reply by 
spoofing its neighbour that, it has best route to the destination. The Blackhole node drops any packets it 
receives rather than forwarding them to destination node (Sharma, K. S. and Sharma, V. 2016) 
 
 Greyhole Attack:  
 
Grey hole is also a type denial-of-service attack where malicious nodes initially act as normal node but 
starts dropping all or some of the packets it receives (Jhaveri, 2012).  
 
 Byzantine Attack: 
 
This can be defined as an attack against the routing protocol in which two or more colluding routers 







 Wormhole Attack:  
 
In this type of attack the adversary node captures the packet at point of the network and tunnels is 
through to another point (Anuj and Sminesh, 2014). Two colluding nodes normally initiate the attack, 
where one node is near the source and another near the destination creates a tunnel to direct the flow of 
packet through the tunnel. 
 
 Rushing Attack: 
 
Rushing attack is the type of attack that results in the Denial-of-Service against Adhoc network routing 
protocols. The attacking node when receive a RREQ, it exploits duplicate suppression mechanism by 
quickly forwarding RREP to gain access to the data being forwarded by the forwarding group. The 
receiver accepts the rushed packet and discards other legitimate RREP packets (Sukiswo and 
Rifquddin, 2015).  
 
 Flooding Attack: 
 
Flooding attack is where a malicious node floods the network with fake RREQs or data packets to 
block the network and hamper any real data transmission by legitimate nodes (Sukiswo and Rifquddin, 
2015). The attacker broadcast many RREQ to communicate with node that might or might not exist in 






 Jellyfish Attack: 
 
In this type of attack a delay is added to the packet by holding the packet for some time before they are 
propagated. The attacking node makes network believe control protocol that there is congestion in the 
network therefore, the network is incapable of meeting the processing requirement of the user. As a 
consequence, this leads to the disruption of the network communication as, the network control 
protocols apply congestion control mechanisms (Kaur, M., Rani, M. and Nayyar, A. 2014). 
  
2.5 Network Security and Cryptography 
 
Cryptography is the art or practice of securing information, in the presence of third party, by converting 
it into unreadable information. The information can only be read by those in possession of the secret 
key to decrypt or decipher the message into plain text. In short, cryptography is the science of writing 
in secret codes. The use of cryptography could be dated back to 1900 B.C (Wang, Ramamurthy and 
Zou, 2006).  Cryptography concerns itself with aiming to achieve four objectives (Davis, 1978; Nie and 
Zhang, 2009 and Zhao et al 2012);  
 
1. Confidentiality: The information can only be read by the receiver for whom it is intended. 
 
2. Availability: A service is available to legitimate users when required. 
 





















      
 
Figure 2.3 Network Security Model 
 
If the above four attributes have been achieved in any systems that has implemented cryptographic 
techniques then that system would be classed as having some level of security achieved. The security 
model in figure 2.3 presents the threat landscape; it shows the consequences if any of the attribute fails, 
it can result in various vulnerabilities. For example, lack of confidentiality can result in an unauthorised 
access to information.  
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The common forms of attacks to compromise confidentiality are man-in-the-middle, eaves dropping 
and traffic analysis as shown in figure 2.3. There are several ways of classifying cryptographic 
techniques, as given below:  
 
1. Secret Key Cryptography (Symmetric key) 
 
2. Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric Key)  
 
3. Hash Functions 
 
4. Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
 
5. Digital Signatures 
 
6. Pairwise Keys 
 
2.5.1 Secret Key Cryptography 
 
Secret key only uses single key for encryption and decryption of message as shown in figure 2.4. It is 
also referred to as symmetric key due to the use of single key. The sender and receiver both possess one 







 Data Encryption Standard (DES) (Davis, 1978; Nie and Zhang, 2009; Rizvi, Hussain and 
Wadhwa, 2011)  
 
 Triple-DES (3DES) (Nie and Zhang, 2009; Rizvi, Hussain and Wadhwa, 2011) 
 
 Advance Encryption Standard (AES) (Sathiamoorthy, Ramakrishnan and Usha, 2015; Nie and 
Zhang, 2009; Rizvi, Hussain and Wadhwa, 2011) 
 
 Camellia (Lu et al, 2012) 
 
 TwoFish (Rizvi, Hussain and Wadhwa, 2011) 
 
 Blowfish (Nie and Zhang, 2009; Rizvi, Hussain and Wadhwa, 2011)  
 
 
            








2.5.2 Public Key Cryptography 
 
Modern PKC first proposed by Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie in 1976 (Wang, Ramamurthy and 
Zou, 2006). The paper basically proposed a cryptosystem where by two parties could communicate 
over a non-secure channel and without having to share a key. The algorithm uses two separate keys to 
encrypt and decrypt message as shown in figure 2.5. It is also referred to as asymmetric key exchange 
protocol due to separate key used for encryption and decryption. One key is used to encrypt the plain 
text known as public key and another key known as private key is used to decrypt the cipher text (Zhao, 




Figure 2.5 Public Key Cryptography 
 
The designated public key can be advertised and therefore, is known to public. The private key 
however, is kept secret. Although, both the keys are mathematically related but the knowledge of 






comes from multiplication vs. factorization problem that are easy to compute and relatively difficult to 
calculate the inverse function (Zhao, et al 2012). This implies that it is easy to multiply two prime 
numbers and get a product but determining the prime factors of that product is long and hard to 
calculate, especially when the number is 400 digits long (Wang, Ramamurthy and Zou, 2006; Koblitz, 
1987). Exponentiation vs. logarithms is the same one-way function problem where it is easy to 
calculate the power of a number but finding the inverse is a hard problem. The use of public key 
cryptography in key exchange and digital signature includes the following:  
 
 
 RSA – named after Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (Sarkar, Kisku, Misra and Obaidat, 2009) 
 
 Diffie - Hellman DH (Wang, Ramamurthy, and Zou, 2006) 
 
 ElGamal – Based on DH exchange 
 
 Digital Signature Algorithm DSA – Created by NSA (Sathiamoorthy, Ramakrishnan, and Usha, 
2015). 
 
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC (Wang, Ramamurthy, and Zou, 2006; Koblitz, 1987). 
 
This thesis uses the Diffie-Hellman ECC. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a public key crypto system 






Miller, 1986). It creates a mechanism for sharing keys among participants that is based on Discrete 
Logarithm Problem DLP that is much more difficult to challenge at equivalent length then other 
algorithm such as RSA. The vast majority of Secure Group Communication SGC (Zou, Ramamurthy 
and Magliveras, 2005) uses DLP-based Diffie Hellman as a basic key agreement. SGC refers to a 
scenario where messages are exchanged between groups of participants in such a way that any third 
party or eavesdropper is unable to glean any information even if they are able to intercept the message 
(Wang, Ramamurthy, and Zou, 2006; Koblitz, 1987).  
 
 
2.5.3 Hash Functions 
 
The hash function is an efficient way of mapping a binary string of arbitrary length to binary string of 
fixed length called hash-value or digest as shown in figure 2.6 (Ragab, Ismail and Farag-Allah, 2001). 
They are also called Message Digest MD or One-Way encryption. Encryption provides confidentiality 
but not necessarily integrity. Hash functions therefore are commonly used to provide integrity to 
messages. It is also used for digital finger printing of file content.  There are number of widely used 
hash function the most common are MD and Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) (Juwad and Al-
Raweshidy, 2008). The common types of MD hash algorithm are as follows: 
 








 Message Digest4 (MD4): (Ragab, Ismail and Farag-Allah, 2001). 
 
 Message Digest5 (MD5): This creates 128-bit key (Ragab, Ismail and Farag-Allah, 2001; 
Thulasimani and Madheswaran, 2009). The SHA have few versions and the difference in the 
version is based on their efficiency and strength. The following are the most common types of 
Secure Hashing Algorithm. 
  
 Secure Hash Algorithm1 (SHA-1):  
This creates 160-bit key (Ragab, Ismail and Farag-Allah, 2001) 
 
 Secure Hash Algorithm2 (SHA-2):  
Option includes a digest between 224 and 512 bits 
 
 Secure Hash Algorithm3 (SHA-3):  










Figure 2.6 Hash Function 
 
 
2.5.4 Hashed Message Authentication Code (HAMC) 
 
This is a type of hash that uses a secret key of some type in its calculation. The receiving party who 
knows the secret key can only calculate the resulting hash and can verify it. The attacker or 
eavesdropper cannot remove or inject data because it doesn’t have the key used for calculation (Zhao, 
et al 2012). 
 
 
2.5.5 Digital Signature 
 
This is a cryptographic technique that uses the Public Key Infrastructure PKI to generate public and 
private key issued by Certificate Authority (CA) (Hinds et al, 2012). The sender digitally signs a 






digitally signed document can only be decrypted by the sender public key (Zhao et al 2012). In 























                   Figure 2.7 Digital Signature Algorithm 
 
 
2.5.6 Pairwise Keys Distribution 
 
According to this scheme, nodes are pre-loaded with keys and after deployment each node exchanges 
key information with its neighbours in order to establish a secure link between them (Chang and 
Agarwal, 2008). The idea is that every node that wants to communicate with other nodes share keys 







2.6 MANET Security Related Work  
 
Extensive research has been done and various security protocols have been proposed by the researchers 
in an attempt to secure different aspects of MANET. The same principles that governs the security of 
MANET such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation, are also used in 
traditional wired network except an important principle i.e. availability (Hinds et al, 2012). The 
mobility of nodes and constantly changing topology makes availability challenging in MANET. It is 
essential to the network operations. MANETs are vulnerable to attack on any level of the open system 
interconnection OSI model including physical attacks such as Denial of  Service DOS or wireless 
jamming techniques as well as attacks on higher-level services such Key Management services (Hinds 
et al, 2012). Some of secure routing protocols developed for MANETs will be briefly discussed and 
analysed such as SAODV (Juwad and Al-Raweshidy, 2008), SEAD (Hu, John and Perrig, 2002), 
TESLA Perrig et al,  2002), Ariadne (Hu, Perrig and Johnson, 2005), SAR (Yi, Naldurg and Kravets, 
(2005), Security Aided Adhoc Routing (Carter and Yasinsac, 2002)  and ARAN (Aran, no date). 
 
2.6.1 Secure Routing Protocol 
 
SAODV: Secure Adhoc On-demand Distance Vector (Juwad and Al-Raweshidy, 2008) routing 
protocol is used to secure the routing messages for the original AODV. Basically the SAODV uses 
digital signature to authenticate non-mutable fields and hash chain to authenticate the mutable field i.e. 







ARAN: Authenticated Routing for Adhoc Network (Aran, no date) is another type of MANET security 
protocol that uses digital signatures to protect the non-mutable fields of the routing messages and uses 
Open SSL library for certification. This is thought to be time consuming and generate a lot of overhead. 
 
SAR: Security Aware Routing protocol (Yi, Naldurg and Kravets, 2005) is a trust based reactive 
protocol. It uses trust values and relationships with the nodes which form the basis of its routing 
decisions. Only trusted nodes can participate in the routing. The protocol does not provide high-end 
security. 
 
SPAAR: Another protocol proposed called Security Aware Aided Adhoc Routing (Carter and 
Yasinsac, 2002). It is a location aware protocol which uses geographical information to secure routing 
information and uses asymmetric cryptography i.e. the use of public key infrastructure for routing. 
 
SEAD: Hu et al (2015) proposed Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance Vector and used a protocol, which 
is based on the design of DSDV. SEAD is designed to prevent attacks such as DoS and resource 
consumption attacks. Also uses One-Way Hash Chains to secure routing. 
 
DSR: Ariadne also developed by Hu et al (2005) which is based on the operation of (Johnson, Hu, and 
Maltz, 2008). Ariadne (Hu et al 2005) uses message authentication code (MAC) and secret key shared 
between two parties to ensures point-to-point authentication of a routing message. Ariadne is a secure 






security against one compromised node and prevents many types of denial-of-service attacks. However, 
it relies on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication TESLA (Perrig et al, 2002). This is 
not suitable for MANET as it requires clock synchronisation.   
 
2.6.2 Trust based schemes 
 
Trust based routing protocol works by adding trust parameters to the nodes. Nodes operate in 
promiscuous mode and hear the conversations between other nodes in transmission range. Trust can be 
computed by taking into account different factors such as packets sent, received, acknowledged and 
forwarded by various nodes in the network. Therefore, nodes representing high trust can be selected as 
best path for communication. Trust schemes are used to mitigate security attacks and identify malicious 
nodes in the network as an alternative to cryptographic methods due to special characteristics of 
MANET. Extensive research has been carried out on the use to trust threshold schemes in MANET. 
The next section will discuss some of trust based schemes proposed.  
 
Several techniques have been proposed to detect and eliminate malicious nodes in the network such as 
(Elhadi, et al, 2013; Marti et al 2000; Nasser and Yunfeng, 2007; Al-Roubaiey et al 2010; Botkar and 
Chaudry, 2011; Balakrishnan, Deng, Varshney, 2005;  Buttyan and Hubaux, 2000; Zhong et al 2003; 
Buchegger and Le-Boudec, 2002; Jhaveri, 2013). One of the earliest techniques proposed was 
Watchdog and Pathrater. The Watchdog technique identifies misbehaving nodes while Pathrater 
technique calculates path avoiding misbehaving nodes (Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker, 2000). The 







According to Buttyan and Hubaux (2000), the concept of incentives called beans to forward packets is 
introduced. Each node in return for participating in packet forwarding earns beans. The packet is 
automatically dropped when the packet run out of beans.  
 
A credit-based scheme known as Sprite was proposed by (Zhong, Chen and Yang, 2003) in which the 
receipts of all packets sent and received are kept and reported to Credit Clearance Services CCS when 
there is an internet connection. The CCS can make decision based on its report about the individual 
nodes.  
 
Scheme called Ex-watchdog proposed by (Nasser and Yunfeng, 2007) was proposed to address the 
weaknesses of watchdog scheme by discovering malicious nodes which can partition the network by 
generating false reports.  
 
Another Intrusion Detection System proposed by (Balakrishnan, Deng, Varshney, 2005) relies on 
watchdog technique to overcome deficiencies in the original watchdog scheme by introducing end-to-
end acknowledge called TWOACK.  
 
Another trust based scheme called Adaptive Acknowledge scheme (AACK) (Botkar and Chaudry, 
2011) is an attempt to reduce detection overhead while increasing detection efficiency through 








Muhammad et al (2015) proposed Adaptive Trust Threshold Strategy for detecting and isolating 
misbehaving node. The main difference is that it adapts to changes in topology and therefore, its 
threshold against which the trust is measured and compared is a dynamic value.  
 
Confident scheme was proposed by Balakrishnan, Deng and Varshney (2005), which is also a 
reputation based scheme. It has four major components Monitor, Reputation System, Path and Trust 
Manager. Monitor performs watchdog function, reputation deals with node rating, path is about path 
rating and trust deals with alert messages.  
 
There have been several detailed surveys conducted to analyse the role of trusted scheme in order to 
secure the network, some of which are discussed in the above section. The aim for the trusted schemes 
is to secure routing by detecting misbehaving node that includes both selfish and misbehaving nodes. 
One of the detailed survey conducted by Cho (2011), gives us an overview into metrics used for 
MANET trust management. The study is formulated in five tables and conclusion of the survey is made 
by making various recommendations. One of the recommendation and suggestion is that the trust 
metric must reflect the unique properties of trust in MANET and trust management design must 
support collaboration in such a way that every node in the network gets adapted to network conditions 
and MANET environment including node density, traffic and mobility patterns. This research has taken 
the similar approach to implement the trust along the same line. The metrics used to calculate dynamic 
trust reflects this approach and represent pure MANET environment (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. and 







2.7 Simulation and Source Code 
 
NS-2 is used as simulation software to implement the proposed secure AODV algorithm. It is an open 
source and one of the most frequently used simulation tool. There are many other simulation tools 














NS-2 is programmed in C++, however there is a separate scripting language used called OTcl, which is 
an object oriented version of Tool Command Language. The TCL is used to generate scenarios. It is 
primarily Linux based but can be run from other OS platforms using additional software. The simulator 






general purpose network simulation. This offers a great benefit as this implies that it is not designed or 
optimised for any specific type of network (NS2 documentation, no date). One of the main advantages 
apart from NS-2 being open source, it is very popular among research community and there is an online 




In this chapter the background information of MANET and its history is covered, including the 
research that has been done so far as well. Different aspects of MANET are thoroughly analysed such 
as how it works, its various features and how it is important and can contribute to the modern day 
technology. Security issues and limitation were also discussed and how these issues have been 
addressed in other research. How trust based schemes have been used to address and implement 
security in MANET were also critically analysed. A detailed analysis of the proposed trusted scheme 














                           Authentication, Trust and Key Management 
 
In this chapter, the association between authentication and trust will be discussed. We argue the 
importance and different forms of authentication from pre and post network initialisation stand point. 
How trust has been used as a framework for authentication and the reason for our selection of various 
parameters to dynamically calculate trust will also be presented. Lastly, how the proposed scheme is 
used to manage secure secret key protocol is also discussed. 
 
The use of public key cryptography, which involves public and private key and the use of certificate 
authority, is not feasible for number of reasons (Zhao et al 2012). As explained in the literature review 
section, it involves the use of a CA to do all types of key management. The deployment of CA in 
MANET poses many challenges such as physical security, reachability, availability and centralized 
mechanism to mention a few (Johnson, Hu and Maltz, 2008). On the other hand, the secret key 
cryptography comes with its own challenges when it comes to implementing them in MANET. One of 
the approaches is that all nodes share the same secret key for authentication and encryption but due to 
the physical security of nodes, even this turns out to be a challenge therefore, the common secret key 
technique is also not fully secure (Davis, 1978; Nie and Zhang, 2009 and Zhao et al 2012). In both the 
approaches, inspite of their security limitations in MANET, one major challenge is that, the keys have 







It was assumed in this thesis that the network is initialised with no predetermined trust; therefore, all 
nodes are treated as equally trusted or having no trust at all. The trust value is normally between 0 and 
1 (Annarasi and Sevanesh, 2014; Johnson et al 2011; Govindan and Mohapatra, 2010; Eladi et al 
2013). When a node joins the network for the first time, it is issued with its reputation that is initialised 
with value 0 i.e. no trust. The proposed trust based scheme is used to build the initial trust required to 
identify any malicious activities and nodes with high trust threshold. The trust information is also used 
to authenticate communicating peer nodes. The scheme proposes a technique that further utilizes the 
trust information gathered during network formation for authenticating any node in the network. The 
authentication scheme works by requesting trust information from the neighbours of the target node. In 
the first instance the neighbour information is requested and then the trust values are obtained from 
those nodes. Once the trust values are received by the requesting node, it authenticates the node by 
checking its trust values. This validates and authenticates the target node.  
 
In this section, various initialisation models and how authentication can be achieved using those model 
has been discussed. We offer a general view of these models and justification of the parameters used 





It is already established that pre-authentication is vital pre-requisite for any network using 
authentication and key exchange protocols (Johnson, Hu and Maltz, 2008; Hu, Perrig and Johnson, 






cannot be ensured then the encryption schemes wouldn’t provide full security solutions. Authentication 
still remains one of the areas that need attention in MANET, especially when new nodes join the 
network and nodes that are not pre-authenticated. Conventionally, authentication can be provided at 
two stages i.e. at network initialisation stage or when the network is running. In the first stage, the 
credentials are exchanges through trusted system and authentication is achieved. In the second stage, 
the security protocols are distributed when the network is initialised. The second type of authentication 
is well-suited for new nodes joining the network and in the scenario when no pre-authentication is 
established at network initialisation stage (Chang and Agarwal, 2008). This leads us to the major and 
important question of how the nodes are able to prove their identity. The difficulty is in providing a 
protected channel for secure credential exchange without sharing any credentials (Zhao et al 2012). 
 
In MANET, nodes can react in a variety of ways to different network scenarios. Before discussing 
different authentication scenario, let us take into consideration some factors that can vary in MANET 
depending upon the application. The following section discusses some of the scenarios and 
assumptions made in the authentication model. 
 
3.2 Authentication models       
 
Node authentication in MANET can be made before or after the network initialisation. The proposed 
authentication model provides a mean of validating peer nodes. The proposed scheme therefore, 
authentication means validating peer nodes through trust calculated by its neighbour. The trust values 
requested from peer’s neighbour nodes are used as source for authentication. Different forms of 






3.2.1 Pre-network initialisation authentication 
 
 Pre-Existing Trust 
According to this trust model, MANET network are able to form pre-existing trust based on prior trust 
among nodes and can be referred to as pre-initialisation authentication. The trust relationship has to 
exist before the network initialises. Pre-authentication models are suitable for certain kind of networks 
but not for others. For instance, the pre-existing trust based network is applicable where no new nodes 
are joining the network. But there is also an issue of mobility as nodes can leave and join the network 
at any time (Zhong et al 2003; Buchegger and Le-Boudec, 2002; Jhaveri, 2013). Although, in such 
types of models the trusted node could extend their trust and authenticate new joining nodes but there is 
an issue of key exchange, performance overhead and new node identity (Hinds et al, 2012). 
  
 Key pre-distribution protocols    
Pre-initialisation authentication uses key pre-distribution protocols to deal with key distribution. This is 
achieved by distributing secret keys among nodes, prior to the network initialisation, via a trusted third 
party node, key distribution centre (KDC) or through bootstrapping (Chang and Agarwal, 2008). Once 
the network initialises, then the nodes can authenticate each other and securely communicate using 
secret keys distributed by trusted third parties. These trusted third parties are external nodes and are 
available at the time of network initialisation. The trusted third parties can be used for individual node 
keys exchange or it could be available to initialise the network as a whole. But once the keys are 
exchanged and network initialised then the secret keys have to be refreshed from time to time and there 






The keys have to be distributed through a secure channel and the nodes identity has to be confirmed 
and verified. The verification of new nodes joining the network is another kind of challenge faced 
when the network is running (Hu et al 2015), i.e., post-initialisation stage in this thesis. 
 
 Internet Gateways         
Given a secure communication channel, network operating in infrastructure mode could provide 
authentication to nodes before the MANET initialises. A trusted third party node connected over the 
internet gateways could periodically provide authentication as proposed by Merin et al (2007). 
According to Gupta et al (2014), who proposed similar authentication scheme using internet gateway to 
facilitate pre-network initialisation authentication. The concept of pre-authentication can be applied to 
few applications but it’s not viable for all MANET applications. For this reason the authentication 
scheme for MANET has to adapt to basic and unique characteristic of MANET discussed in previous 
section. 
 
3.2.2 Post-network initialisation authentication 
 
Internal Trusted Third Party 
 
In this section, various options and ways of post initialisation authentication have been explored. In 
MANET the nodes have no prior trust and are faced with the challenges of authentication, before 
network initialises as highlighted in the above section. MANET nodes can be authenticated using 






challenging of all the authentication schemes that will be discussed. Although, they can address various 
challenges faced by pre-authentication schemes but are hard to implement, as they are meant to be 
completely self-organized. This design represents pure MANET (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. and 
Nordmark, E. 2004) as there is no centralized mechanism and infrastructure required. Nodes are chosen 
on the basis of certain characteristics and parameters that can be responsible for distributing and 
revoking keys. The keys can be symmetric or asymmetric (Hinds et al, 2012).  
 
Symmetric keys or private keys are generated by trusted nodes and distributed to all nodes in the 
network. Securing MANET using these types of schemes comes with different types of challenges as 
well. For instance having no centralized network the key distribution, node identity, wireless channel 
link breakages, mobility and availability of mobile are the main challenges faced. Ariadne proposed by 
Hu, Y. C., Perrig, A. and Johnson, D. B. (2005) uses message authentication code (MAC) and secret 
key shared between two parties to ensures point-to-point authentication of a routing message. 
 
Public key exchange protocols have so far turned out to be the most suitable for MANET. These 
protocols could be applied in variety of ways and combinations, to be able to address the authentication 
issue. Hu et al (2002) uses one way hash chain for authentication and secure routing protocols. The 
Secure Adhoc On-demand Distance Vector SAODV uses digital signature to authenticate non-mutable 
fields and hash chain to authenticate the mutable field i.e. hop count for both route request RREQ and 
route reply RREP message (Zapata and Asokan, 2002). ARAN (Aran no date) is another type of 
MANET security protocol that uses digital signatures which is again a Public Key Exchange protocol. 






protocol which uses geographical information to secure routing information and uses asymmetric 
cryptography i.e. the use of public key infrastructure for routing. 
 
3.2.3 Hybrid Authentication 
 
 This is a hybrid scheme where external Trusted Third Parties are used to authenticate nodes in pre-
initialised state and at the same time the network is equipped with internal Third Party Trusted nodes 
distributed in the network to take care of the post network initialisation authentication (Liu, Zhang and 
Zhao, 2013).  
 
3.3 Trust and Key Management   
 
Trust and key management makes are vital sections of the proposed security scheme. Therefore, how 
the trust scheme has been implemented to authenticate nodes and ECDH algorithm is used to form a 
shared secret key will be discussed.  
 
All the nodes in the network undergo a process of trust establishment. This process is very challenging 
in MANET and hard to achieve, as the topology is changing and nodes are mobile. When the trust is 
fully established in all nodes and any misbehaving and malicious node is identified and isolated, then 
the trusted nodes are used for key exchange.  
 
Trust based schemes are normally formed using pre-determined threshold values. These values are 






throughout the life of a network.  Before the network is formed the threshold value is set, therefore, the 
decision to accurately calculate trust, is most challenging. The reason being the dynamic nature of 
MANET and nodes are not in a single state. Parameters determining the trust state may change due to 
constantly changing topology. Therefore, making a selection based on pre-determined and static value 
can result in completely undesirable selection of trusted nodes. This further implies that the static 
threshold may not always work and could lead to an undesirable outcome.  The nodes are mobile and 
the topology is constantly changing, in those circumstances the static threshold information cannot be 
fully relied upon and could potentially generate false positives. Therefore, a dynamically calculated 
threshold value is proposed, which will take the parameters into account such as node neighbours, 2-
hop neighbours, mobility and energy to work out the trust. The analytical model section explains in 
detail how the parameter are calculated and implemented in the proposed trust and threshold 
calculation. 
 
The trust schemes discussed in the above section relies on static trust value and does not take into 
account MANET specific conditions into account. For instance, the Watchdog technique identifies 
misbehaving nodes while Pathrater technique would calculate path avoiding misbehaving nodes (Marti 
et al 2000) using static trust values. Another example of a scheme using static trust is Adaptive 
Acknowledge scheme (AACK), (Botkar and Chaudry, 2011) is an attempt to reduce detection overhead 
while increasing detection efficiency through detecting misbehaving node rather than link proposed in 
TWOACK (Balakrishnan, Deng and Varshney, 2005). Adaptive scheme is used by Muhammad et al 
(2015), to determine trust of a node but it doesn’t offer any authentication, confidentiality or 
encryption. They have not considered node energy in their adaptive scheme, which is an important 






packet to conserve energy and thus, generate false positive (Gupta, and Sexena, 2010). Also their 
individual trust calculation is the summation of trust from all nodes but does not clearly state the detail 
of how the trust is calculated. Lastly, their trust scheme mainly aims at isolating malicious nodes which 
can partition the network and reducing false positives. 
 
The proposed scheme uses a trust table where the trust values between all nodes are exchanged first via 
hello packets and added in the table.  Hence the table is populated with all the trust values of neighbour 
nodes. The trust values are used to derive the final trust value called Average Trust Threshold. The 
trust table holds all the average trust values and Average Trust threshold values which is an important 
aspect of the proposed protocol. It is important that the Trust table is up to date and it is always updated 
when the hello packets are exchanged (Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). Another important factor of the 
Trust table is to authenticate two communicating peers by sending the Average Trust values when 
requested.  
 
3.4 Node Degree and Two-Hop Neighbours 
 
Node degree is defined as the number of nodes in node’s one-hop neighbourhood. Two nodes are 
considered as Neighbours when they are within communication range and at a specific time interval. 
Although there might have been no communication or message exchange between the nodes during the 
time interval the nodes have been in transmission range but they are still regarded as Neighbours (Khan 
et al 2015). The process of maintaining neighbour list is via Hello message exchange. Hello message 







3.5 False Positives and False Negatives 
 
The trust model mainly depends on the information it receives from neighbour and two-hop neighbour 
nodes for its trust calculation and as a result identifying trusted and malicious nodes in network. One of 
the reasons for the selection of Dynamic Threshold calculation for trust calculation is to reduce false 
positives and false negatives. This is to ensure that the scheme is tuned to give effective results and 
offer tangible security. 
 
3.5.1 False Positives: When a node classes another node as untrusted where it is a trusted node, it has a 
significant negative effect on network performance and the trust model (Gupta, and Sexena, 2010). 
False positives are cumbersome and they burn operation cycle. The node could potentially be regarded 
as malicious and therefore excluded from routing process.  
 
3.5.2 False Negatives: This is when a node is classed as trusted node but it’s a malicious node. False 
positives are even worst as there is no indication that the node is compromised. It is equally important 
for the trust model to identify such nodes and accurately calculate trust. If the scheme fails to recognize 
malicious node it could compromise the whole network (Gupta, and Sexena, 2010).   
 
3.5.3 True Positives: This is when the scheme is doing its job properly and accurately identifying 
nodes that are trusted. All node are working as they should that is to calculate trust values correctly and 







3.5.4 True Negative: This is again trust values shared by nodes regarding other nodes trust that have 
been correctly calculated. True negative is when a node is correctly identified as malicious. This again 
a positive thing and indicates that the efficacy of the proposed scheme is working. 
               
3.6 Key Management 
 
The Key management issue in MANET could be handled in various ways and there exists different 
classifications schemes that have been proposed in the past (Hinds et al, 2012). The fact that MANET 
have no centralized mechanism and infrastructure and nodes are mobile makes the use of cryptographic 
key management one of the daunting task for securing network using such schemes. These schemes 
come with issues like performance, resource overhead, wireless links issues and node’s physical 
security. According to Zhao et al (2012), key management deals with Generating Keys, Exchanging or 
keys distribution, Verifying keys, Storing Keys and Revoking keys at the end of their lifetime (Liu, 
Zhang and Zhao, 2013). 
 
The keys exchange process is crucial part of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Scheme using PKI for 
authenticating nodes in MANET, there are various issues that needs addressing to generate, distribute, 
refresh and revoke expired keys (Hinds et al, 2012).  
 
There are certain factors that need to be taken into account for the keys to be exchanged securely 
especially when they are applied in MANET. Therefore, various reasons are discussed as why these 









The network is a critical resource as it allows the communication between various devices. In Manet 
environment the nodes acting as router are acting as communication device at the same time therefore, 
it is the life blood as it carries the vital traffic from source to the destination node (Liang, Poor and 
Ying, 2011). The presence of malicious node or an attack on a node could mean a potential failure of 
the network but at the same time excluding a legitimate node due to false positives could be devastating 
for the network as well. Any failure could be a Denial-of-Service against the particular service the 
Manet is used for. If the node is not available to authorized users, the impact could be significant as 
they rely on one another to form a network and communicate (Mohandas, Silas and Sam, 2013).   
 
In wireless networks availability as whole can be a challenge as wireless networks are highly 
susceptible to Denial-of-Service attack due to no physical connection needed to launch an attack unlike 
in wired networks, where a physical connection is required (Mohandas, Silas and Sam, 2013). All 
nodes before initiating any data communication would need to request the trust values from all their 
corresponding neighbours in order to authenticate each other. The trust information requested from 
neighbour nodes needs to be exchanged in specific interval of time, otherwise it may result in causing 
delay or in worst case scenario the information may fail to reach the target nodes. These failures will 
result in authentication failure and hence communication will never initiate as the trust cannot be 
calculated. Therefore, the nodes needs to be available and ready to send the information requested. The 








 3.8 Energy 
 
Energy of the node is concerned with power resource. Energy model maintain total energy at each node 
in wireless network. Energy model in NS-2 is used to set initial energy and monitor it for each node 
during simulation. As nodes in MANET are mobile and there is no continuous power supply therefore, 
the energy resource is scarce. This is an important factor and needs consideration in MANET 
application. The nodes having low power could drop all or some packets to save energy (Gupta, and 
Sexena, 2010). The power saving act of nodes could easily be mistaken with Grey Hole attack (Jhaveri 
2012), where malicious nodes initially act as normal node but starts dropping all or some of the packets 
it receives. This could result in false positives as the node is not malicious but dropping packets due 
energy conservation (Gupta, and Sexena, 2010). Hence, if the node’s energy level is low and it starts to 
drop some of the packets, a possibility cannot be ruled out that the node is acting in such a way, only to 
save energy, rather than jump to a conclusion that it is a malicious node and is excluded from the 
network.  
 
3.9 Mobility  
 
The basic neighbour discovery requires node to be stable in the regions. Nodes that are constantly 
changing regions won’t have any neighbours. According to Rajesh and Gnanasekar, (2016), the 
constant motion of nodes across boundaries limits the usefulness of basic neighbour discovery. 
According to Khan et al (2015), the mobility has significant and direct effect on how a malicious node 
is detected in the network. The higher the node speed, the lesser is its detection rate, as compared to the 






(2015). Therefore, mobility is considered as an important parameter in determining Trust Threshold of 
on node in a MANET.  A mobile node Dynamic Threshold being lower due to its high mobility has to 
be taken into account to decide whether it is trusted or not trusted. On the other side, in static trust all 
nodes are compared against a static value which essentially does not take any mobility into account and 
considers all nodes the same.  
 
From the above, a conclusion can be drawn that node with relatively low mobility carry more weight 
than the highly mobile node. Since the outcome for highly mobile node according to the above 
analysis, is a lower Dynamic Threshold therefore, it will also be excluded from being selected as trust 
worthy. The Dynamic Threshold value will prevent this as being a lower value obtained due to mobility 
when compared with static trust value.  
 
3.10 Confidentiality   
 
In key exchange and data exchange one of the most important conditions is confidentiality (Mohandas, 
Silas and Sam, 2013). This implies that the key information is not leaked and kept secret at all times 
and only the intended recipient can read it. The data is therefore, encrypted during the transit to ensure 
the data is not disclosed. But authentication is equally important when it comes to ensure 
confidentiality (Meddeb et al 2017). Authenticity means the message that claims to be from a given 
source is in fact from that source. Hence, having confidence in the source of a message is critical. If an 
unauthorized user obtains the keys for another authorize user could easily authenticates its self. The 
process of authorizing nodes in a static network could be performed via a centralized authority but in 






therefore, a different approach is needed (Mohandas, Silas, and Sam, 2013). A novel approach is 
adopted in the proposed scheme, which is mutual trust authentication scheme for authenticating peer 




The proposed scheme uses the concept of trust to secure the network from malicious nodes. The 
association between trust and authentication is explained in this chapter and how trust is important in 
MANET where, no other form of security can be implemented as nodes communicate for the first time. 
Various forms of trust implementation before and after network initialisation and their benefits will 

















Routing protocol discussed in previous sections doesn’t take and into account any security aspects. In 
this section, the analytical model of the proposed scheme, details of the protocol design stages and any 
further specifications involved in designing the algorithm are presented.  
 
The aim of the protocol is to provide a platform and serve as a building block for various other advance 
network security protocols in MANET. The thesis aim is to keep the specification general as possible 
to demonstrate that out proposed solution can be adopted and run on majority of underline routing 
protocol or other classes of MANET application. As no centralized mechanism and highly dynamic 
environment this protocol can serve as an initiating point to generate and distribute security keys 
without relying on conventional network setup. According to RFC 3756 (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. 
and Nordmark, E. 2004) which discusses Trust Models for various networks, including Adhoc network, 
it is assumed that a truly Adhoc network is where all the nodes meet and form a network for the first 
time and there is no prior trust relationship among nodes. The proposed solution is designed by taking 
into account this particular feature of Adhoc network that there is no prior security relation between the 
nodes. 
 
A proposed two phased solution is outlined below. While the two-phased approach has a higher start-








 Phase One: Dynamic Trust Threshold scheme and Authentication 
 
 Phase Two : How to provide 
 
1. Confidentiality  
 




In the first phase the aim is to work out the trust of each node to identify the trusted and malicious 
nodes. Any malicious nodes identified are excluded from the network so they cannot take part in any 
routing process or data communication. Each node performs a local calculation of trust value and 
dynamic trust threshold value of all its neighbours. The final stage of phase-one is to authenticate two 
communicating node before any data exchange by requesting trust value from communicating partner’s 
node Neighbours. This step adds an additional layer of security to validate and verify trust. The 
common way to validate the routing protocol or security protocol in network is through various 
simulation tools (Sing and Verma, 2015: Elhadi et al 2013 and Al-Roubaiey, 2010). In the following 
section, an analytical model of the proposed algorithm is presented as an additional way to evaluate and 
validate the results. The proposed phase-one of Trust threshold scheme can be calculated in the 







Step-1: The trust value is calculated for each node in the network by nodes listening to neighbours in 
promiscuous mode and recording the number of packets sent and received.  
 
Step-2: Various metrics are used to calculate the dynamic threshold value (k) for each node in the 
network. Out of the five parameters, the trust value is calculated using local values as described in step 
one by each node, while the other parameters such as one-hop, two-hop, speed and energy are obtained 
from the neighbour node for which the trust is calculated. These values are passed to neighbour nodes 
using hello-packets (Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). 
.  
 
Step-3: The trust value calculated using step-one is compared with the static arbitrary trust value of 0.6 
(Khan et al 2015). If the trust value is less than the static trust value, the trust value is compared against 
the dynamic trust threshold value calculated using step-2, in order to dynamically work out the trust of 
each node. A static arbitrary value is a fixed value and can be changed depending on MANET 
condition and applications requirements. The static trust value remains fixed for the whole network life 
and explained in section 4.4 in detail. As a result, nodes having less than static trust but greater than or 
equal to dynamic trust threshold value will be regarded as trusted or otherwise they will be classed as 
untrusted as show in figure 4.1 and algorithm 4.2. 
 
Step-4: The trust values are requested by the communicating nodes to authenticate each other. This step 
involves peer nodes requesting trust values from their corresponding neighbour nodes. As, all nodes 






peer nodes to authenticate its peer. This is another layer to add additional security to an already trusted 
frame work. 
 
In majority of the trust based schemes proposed (Elhadi, et al, 2013; Marti et al 2000; Nasser and 
Yunfeng, 2007; Al-Roubaiey et al 2010; Botkar and Chaudry, 2011), the average trust value of nodes 
obtained, is compared against a predetermined trust threshold value. This predetermined threshold 
value is a static value and remain static throughout the life of the network. The threshold value is static 
because it does not take any topology or MANET changes into account. One of the characteristic of a 
MANET is that, it is highly dynamic and mobile and therefore, these factors have to be taken into 
account (Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011). By comparing the static trust value against the dynamic trust 
threshold, two important goals are achieved, firstly, the trusted nodes are identified and secondly, any 
malicious nodes identified as a result are excluded dynamically. As discussed before the trusted 
framework will form the first layer called phase-one of the security model and phase-two will be built 
on top. The data flow diagram in figure 4.1 below represents various step in calculating parameters and 
threshold values are derived and compared to identify nodes trust dynamically. The trust for all nodes 
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 In the phase-two, ECDH algorithm is implemented to exchange keys between nodes to secure 
communication by encrypting any data sent between nodes. The ECDH will be discussed in more 
details in next the section 4.5 and the analytical model will be presented to show how the proposed 
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4.3.1 Threshold Calculation k 
The aim of phase-one is to dynamically calculate and identify the trusted and malicious nodes in the 
network. The Dynamic Trust value is compared with the trust value calculated by individual neighbour 
nodes from their personal observation. This Trust value is then compared against a static pre-
determined trust value of 0.6 (Khan et al 2015) and Dynamic Trust value to obtain the final trust of all 
the nodes in the network as described in figure 4.1 in chapter 4. This whole process will provide a 
foundation for first layer of security in the form trusted nodes in the network and identifying and 
excluding any malicious nodes. As mentioned earlier, the proposed scheme provides a common 
platform, which can be adapted to most of the MANET standard routing protocols. A threshold 
represented as ‘k’ is calculated for all the metrics used to calculate dynamic trust. The following 
section explains in detail, how the threshold of each metric and the dynamic trust is calculated.  
 
4.3.2 One-Hop Neighbour Threshold  
            
We consider a MANET, comprising of a number of mobile nodes. It is a multi-hop wireless network 
modelled as undirected graph G represented as G (V, E), whereas V is the set of nodes and E is the set 
of wireless links E = V x V (Sukiswo and Rifquddin, 2015) as shown in figure 4.2. 
 













   Represents Graph G 
   Represents set of wireless nodes V 
          Represents vertices E 
 




E: set of wireless link also known as edges 
 
V: set of nodes 
 
Uniform transmission range r0 is assumed among all nodes V. A wireless link between two nodes ‘a’ 
and ‘c’ is represented as (a, c) and link existence between the two nodes is represented as (a, c) v E. 
The above representation is defined as the wireless link or 1-hop Neighbours exists (a, c) v E if and 
only if the Euclidean distance between nodes ‘a’ and ‘b’ is smaller than the transmission range r0. 










Figure 4.3 One-Hop Neighbours of Node 
 
 
Two nodes have a common link and classed as neighbours, if they are within each other’s transmission 
range r0. Node degree is thus the number of nodes in any given node’s one-hop neighbourhood (Rajesh 
and Gnanasekar, 2016). The number of One-hop Neighbourhood is directly proportional to overall 
threshold of any node for the proposed scheme thus, higher the number of neighbour nodes the higher 
the threshold value.  
 
The node degree of node a at time t can be represented as da(t), with transmission range r0 for isolated 







neighbourhood has a higher trust. The range threshold (k) value, ranges from Min = 0 to Max = 1. The 







          ………………….Equation 4.2 
Hence if, 
 
da = 5 and |V| = 20, then k =  5/20 = 0.25   
 
 Where: 
k: is threshold  
da: Neighbours of node a  
|V|: Total number Neighbours of node a 
 
4.3.3 Two-Hop Neighbours Threshold  
 
This is defined as a sub-graph of G denoted as Ga which consists of one-hop and two-hop neighbours 
of a. According to Khan et al (2015), if there is a wireless link between nodes c and e, then e is a two-
hop neighbour of a, and is represented as (a, c) v E.  Figure 4.4 below shows two-hop neighbours of a 
node. Two-hop neighbours can be represented by the following equation: 










2-Hop(a): Two-hop neighbours of a 
 
c: Neighbour node of a 
 
e: 2-hop neighbour of a 
 
E: Represents edges 
 
















                           Figure 4.4 Two-Hop Neighbours  
 
The threshold k of nodes is a value between (0, 1), 0 means minimum and 1 means maximum value. 
The node with highest 1 and 2-hop neighbours has the highest k threshold and a node with no 
neighbour has lowest threshold (k). 
 
The two-hop of any node can be obtained from the routing table and is defined as b(a, u) for node “a”, 
as any indirect two-hop nodes “w” that could be reached through direct neighbour  node “u”.  Having a 
set A of vertices, the neighbourhood of A is the union of the neighbourhood of the vertices, and so it is 

















b(a, u) = 5 and |2-hop(a)| = 20, then k =  5/20 = 0.25   
Where: 
 
k: is threshold 
ba : Represents two-hop neighbours of a 
b(a, u) : Two-hop neighbours of node a via node b 
|2-hop(a)|: Total number of two-hop neighbours of node a via all neighbours.       
 
According to the above equation, the threshold for two-hop node can be defined as, the number of 2-
hop nodes accessible via node (u) divided, the total number of two-hop nodes of node “a”, through all 
neighbours. The threshold has maximum value (1) if the b(a, u) is (1) i.e. they are directly 
proportional. And the threshold will be 0, if b(a, u) is 0, which indicates the number of 2-hop 
connectivity for this particular node. 
 
4.3.4 Mobility Threshold 
 
Node mobility is defined as speed at which a particular node is traversing the network. According to 
Khan et al (2015), the node mobility can be calculated as the rate of link change. The mobility of a 
node is used to determine its mobility threshold. A node is considered to be stable and reliable if it has 













 aa          ………………….Equation 4.5 
Hence if, 
ma = 5 m/sec and |m| = 20 m/sec, then k = 1-5/20 = 0.75 m/sec  
Where: 
k : Threshold 
ma : Speed of node a m/s 
|m|: Maximum speed of a m/sec 
 
According to the equation 4.5, if the mobility is high, than the mobility threshold is 0 and if the 
mobility is low then the threshold is 1 i.e. high. The detail explanation is presented in chapter 3.  
 
4.3.5 Trust threshold (t) 
The trust value is calculated through recording activities of neighbour nodes, as all the nodes operate in 
promiscuous mode and can hear the transmissions such as packets sent, received, dropped and 
acknowledgements etc.  
 
Trust calculation is an important factor and hold highest weightage in terms of the metrics. A novel 






misbehaving nodes in the network. MANET is highly dynamic therefore, the trust is calculated along 
with the metrics outlined and explained above. This ensures that the network conditions and dynamic 
nature is taken into account. In this way, the threshold gets adapted to the changing environment and 
the network has the capability to identify any malicious and misbehaving nodes dynamically. A trust 
data base is maintained by all nodes and is exchanged periodically through hello packets, therefore, an 
extension is used and the hello packet is modified to transport the trust values for its Neighbours 
(Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). Every node maintains a trust table that records the trust values received 
from every Neighbours. Nodes listening to Neighbours, records their number of packets received and 
forwarded in a trust table by using the equation 4.6. There are two types of trust value calculated 






4.3.6 Average Trust 
 
This value is calculated by each node for its neighbour nodes. Each node listening in promiscuous 
mode calculates the average trust value using equation 4.6 and forwards it via hello packet to all 
neighbours (Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). Once a node has received average trust value calculated for 
particular neighbour node from all its corresponding neighbour nodes, then the trust threshold can be 







      
Packets of Num. Total
vedsent/recei Packets of Num. Total
 Trust  Ave     …………Equation 4.6 
 
4.3.7 Trust Threshold 
 
Every node in the network needs to calculate this value in order to compare it with dynamic trust 
threshold value, to determine the trust level of every node. Once all the average trust values are 
received from neighbour for a particular node then the trust threshold can be derived using equation 4.7 
below:  
 
Trust Threshold = 
NodesNeighbour  of Num. Total
Trust Ave Sum
 ……………….Equation 4.7 
    
The trust threshold value represents the trust of each node. This value also gives us an input for 
equation 4.10, where the trust threshold is represented as ‘  ’ to calculate the dynamic trust 



















t: Trust threshold value calculated by each neighbour node 
N: Total number of neighbours  
k: The Final average trust threshold of node a. 
i: Node index 
a: Node 
 
The proposed scheme presents a new concept of each node maintaining trust table where the trust 
values are exchanged periodically via hello packets (Bhanot and Chaudhary 2017). Once the trust table 
is fully populated and the trust threshold values are generated for each neighbour then the next step is 
to calculate the final dynamic trust threshold value. 
 
4.3.8 Energy Threshold 
 
A critical constraint in MANET is that, all nodes employ batteries, so it is difficult to change or 
recharge batteries on the go. Therefore, all systems, processes and communication protocols or 
schemes designed for MANET must take into consideration how to minimize power consumption. The 
aim is to simulate an energy source and keep track of energy consumption of nodes in the network. 
Energy consumption is an important metric for evaluating the trust threshold (Gupta, and Sexena, 
2010). Energy model built in NS2 is implemented to access the energy of node during 







Nodes in MANET are limited in their energy resources as there is no constant power supply available. 
Given the energy resource constraint, all the nodes must have sufficient power resource to process 
information and take part in any data exchange and does not go offline due to no power. The power 
resource is directly linked with availability, the importance of which was discussed in the section 
above. Also, nodes in MANET can drop packet either intentionally (malicious) or unintentionally to 
save energy.  Nodes having low power resource can start misbehaving by dropping packets only to 
conserve energy. This is an important factor in identifying false positive. The energy parameter will 
take the energy level of nodes into account to find out the reason for node’s packet dropping. 
 
The NS2 built-in energy model is used for energy calculation. The initial energy of node is set to 100 
and the other energy parameters are presented in detail in the performance evaluation chapter. The 
initial energy is used as a basis to calculate the overall energy of each node from network initialisation 






 αa          ………………….Equation 4.9 




k : Threshold 






a: Node  
|e|: Maximum energy 
 
4.3.9 Dynamic Threshold 
 
This is the final value we need, to complete phase-one of the proposed scheme. The dynamic value is 
derived from the parameters used in the above sections. Therefore, once all the parameters are 
calculated including the Trust Threshold value, the next step is to calculate Dynamic Threshold value. 
The metrics obtained for each node represents its corresponding parameters in the network.  
 
 
According to Khan et al (2015), the Dynamic threshold of each node in the network can be calculated 
by combining all the threshold values obtained from equations 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.8 and 4.9 for a particular 
node that are used to calculate all the thresholds parameters (kd, kb, km, kt, ke).  
The Dynamic Threshold equation is derived as follows 
 






















  ….……………Equation 4.10 








ka : Dynamic threshold of node “a”   
kda: represents the 1-hop neighbour threshold 
kba: is the 2-hop neighbour threshold 
kma: is the mobility threshold 
kta : is the trust threshold 
kea: is the energy threshold 
 
w_ : Weight representing the weightage of 1-hop neighbours 
 
w_ :  Weight representing the weightage of 2-hop neighbours 
 
w_ : Weight representing the weightage for mobility 
 
w_ : Weight representing the weightage for trust value 
 
w_ : Weight representing the weightage for energy 
 
The weight value can be increased or decreased according to need. They are initially set to (1). For 
instance, the information gathered by neighbours carry more weight than the two-hop neighbour, as 






can have greater observation recorded and trust validated. The figure 4.5 shows a screen-shot of when 
the trusted scheme is run in NS2. 
 
   Figure 4.5 NS2 simulation of Trust Threshold calculation  
 
4.4 Numerical Model 
 
This section presents a numerical model by applying sample values shown in table 4.3 and 4.4, to 
calculate static and dynamic trust respectively. The dynamic trust is calculated by applying value in 
table 4.4, as an input to the equation 4.10. The results obtained are presented and analysed in this 
section. The aim is to reduce false positive generated as a result of static pre-determined trust. A 
numerical model is presented with sample values to demonstrate how static trust model can result in 
false positive compared to applying the same set of values will result in true positive when dynamic 






4.7 and the dynamic trust threshold value using equation 4.10, the trust of node is computed as shown 
in algorithm 4.2. While the steps in algorithm 4.1, represent how the node trust is calculated using 







     
 
Algorithm 4.1 Static Trust Algorithm 
 
 
The algorithm 4.2 presents the algorithm for calculating dynamic trust. The dynamic trust model takes 









     
 
Algorithm 4.2 Dynamic Trust Algorithm 
 
Begin 
Compute Node Trust 
Compute Dynamic Threshold 
If Node Trust >= 0.6 || >=Dynamic Threshold then 
               Trusted  
 Else 




Compute Node Trust 
Compute Static Trust 
If Node Trust >= 0.6 then 
               Trusted  
 Else 








In this thesis an arbitrary value of 0.6 (Khan et al 2015) is used as static trust and can be changed if a 
stricter trust needs to be applied due to specific network requirements or applications. This is the 
conventional way of calculating trust referred to as static pre-determined trust model, where the static 
value remains constant and it never changes. It remains the same for the entire network life (Khan et al 
2015). 
 
The algorithm 4.1 presents the steps involved in determining the static trust of a node. If a node has 
trust value greater than 0.6, then the node is classified as trustworthy. But if the trust value is less than 
0.6, then it is classified as untrusted. 
 
 But in algorithm 4.2, when the node trust value turns out to be less than 0.6, then it is compared 
against the dynamic threshold. The dynamic trust would ensure the node trust value is scrutinized 
dynamically according to node specific conditions in MANET. 
 
The dynamic nature of node in MANET could result in lower trust calculation, as discussed before, and 
can result in false positives. The trust value could be lower due to MANET specific conditions 
affecting the trust value but using static trust, this cannot be detected and the node is classed as not 
trusted.  
 
The numerical model shows the comparison between the static and dynamic trust resulting in true 
positive, true negative and false positive results. The table 4.4 shows the trust threshold calculated of a 






result is a false positive for this particular node where the trust value is 0.4, shown in the last column of 
table 4.3. As the node trust value is 0.4, which is less than 0.6, indicating that the node is untrusted and 
has resulted in a false positive. But if analysed deeply, the node trust is low because the MANET 
conditions for this particular node, such as lesser node density, high mobility and low energy has 
resulted in lower trust.  As discussed already, the trust of a node is dependent upon the four metrics and 
plays a vital role when trust is calculated, which obviously were not taken into consideration when 
static trust is calculated.  
 
Metrics True Negative  True Positive  False Positive 
Hope-One 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Hope-Two 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Trust Threshold 0.3 0.8 0.4 
Energy 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Mobility 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Static Trust 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 
Table 4.3 Static Trust Matrix 
 
The graph in figure 4.6 presents the static trust model. The graph shows the outcome resulting in a true 
negative, true positive and a false positive when a static trust is applied to a particular node, given the 









Figure 4.6 Static Trust  
 
But on the other hand, the same node will be classed as trusted, previously declared as untrusted by 
static trust model using the same data set shown in table 4.4, due to its trust value (0.4). The trust value 
0.4 is higher than the dynamic trust value (0.38), as shown in the table 4.4, therefore, using the 
proposed dynamic trust scheme for these set of variable would result in true positive, which means the 

























Metrics True Negative  True Positive  True Positive 
Hope-One 0.7 0.3 0.3 
Hope-Two 0.8 0.5 0.5 
Trust Threshold 0.3 0.8 0.4 
Energy 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Mobility 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  Dynamic Trust 0.56 0.5 0.38 
Static Trust 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 

























In figure 4.6, the graph shows that if only static value is used to calculate trust then it will result in false 
positive but using static trust combined with dynamic will result in true positive, as shown in last 
column (true positive) of table 4.4. When the graph is analysed in figure 4.7, all the metric values 
shown reflect the values given in the table 4.4. This proves that applying dynamic and static trust 




The second security phase which is confidentiality and data encryption, the model of AODV protocol 
process is presented. It involves implementing the cryptographic protocol before any data exchange 
between communication nodes. When both phase-one and phase-two are combined they provide a 
foundation to secure key exchange between any communicating nodes. The key exchange process is 
explained in detail in the next section. The secret key could be used for the following: 
 
1. Authentication and authorization 
 
2. Encrypting data exchange between nodes 
 
3. Provide protection against 
 
 Blackhole attack 






4.5.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
DH scheme allows us to exchange secure information between sender and the receiver over insecure 
channel. This is an example of asymmetric algorithm. According to this algorithm, two nodes exchange 
public keys and then each performs a calculation on their individual private key and the public key of 
the other. The result of this whole process gives us an identical shared key (Nikama and Raut, 2015). 
The shared key obtained is used for encrypting and decrypting data between two nodes. The scheme 
provides a framework about how to perform key generation and exchange between parties or devices 
that do not yet have secure connection to establish shared keying material (key that can be used with 
symmetrical keying algorithm such as AES, DES, HMAC) therefore, it is more a key-agreement 
protocol than an encryption algorithm (Elhadi, et al 2013 and Misic, 2008). Elleptic Curve Diffie 
Hellman is more efficient variant of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol which will be used in the 
proposed scheme. They are used in public key cryptography for conceiving efficient factorization 
algorithm (Wong, Ramamurthy and Zou, 2006).  
 
According to Gajbhiya, Karmakar and Sharma (2015), Public key protocols are designed on the 
principle of hardness of solving the following two problems: 
 
1. Factorization of large integers 
 







The main idea behind the above concept is the trapdoor one way function (Gajbhiya, Karmakar and 
Sharma, 2015).  
 
A one way Trapdoor function, as shown in equation 4.11 is such that it satisfies the following 
conditions: 
  
 Given x, Y= )(xf  is easy to compute 
 Given Y, it is computationally infeasible to calculate x = )Y(
1
f ….Equation 4.11 
 
Elliptic curves are set of points defined by the solution to the equation 4.12 below: 
 
                                      ………………….Equation 4.12 
 
Where: 
a: is an element of field  
b: is an element of field  
K: is a field. 
Some of the fields K that elliptic curves are defined over are 
 R: Real numbers 






 C: Complex numbers 
 Z: Integers modulo p represented as Z/pZ 
Following is the example of a graph of elliptic curve over real numbers R. 
 
                                      
 
Figure 4.8 Elliptic Curve over Integer Modulo p (Gajbhiya, Karmakar and Sharma, 2015) 
Also there is a point at infinity represented as O and a condition that: 
 
                                 ……………….….Equation 4.13 
 
According to Wong, Ramamurthy and Zou (2006), Discrete Logarithm Problem DLP is a type of one-
way function as explained above, in which exponentiation is easy but logarithm is difficult to compute. 
The types of cyclic groups used in public key cryptosystem are 
 
Example of DLP in  
 Given the finite cyclic group of order p-1 and  primitive element and 







 The DLP is the difficult computation of determining the integer such that   
 
                ……..……………Equation 4.14 
 
Elliptic curves uses shorter encryption keys hence consume fewer memory and CPU resources. It offers 
more security per bit in increase in size and is more computationally efficient then the first generation 
RSA and Diffie-Hellman public key systems (Tottanesce 2012). The figure 4.5 below shows the 
comparison of Diffie-Hellman and RSA key exchange protocols using elliptic curve (Misic 2008). 
 
Symmetric Encryption 
   (Key Size in Bits) 
RSA and Diffie-Hellman 
(Modulus Size in Bits) 
ECC Key Size  
    (in Bits) 
56 512 112 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 512 
 







The above comparison shows, that the elliptic curve keys are much smaller (Misic 2008). The ratio of 
the key lengths utilizing the protocol from multiplicative group using modulus mod p as shown in table 
4.1, to the key length of elliptic curve protocol is increased from 6:1 for 80 bits, 12:1 for 128 bits and 
30:1 for 256 bits (Gajbhiya, Karmakar and Sharma, 2015). This implies that the more security is 
required, the more efficient ECC becomes. 
 
The following section describes various steps needed to configure ECDH protocol.  
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field k.  
Let P, Q be points on E such that P = nQ for some integer n.  
Let |P| denote the number of bits needed to describe the point P. 
 
If one wishes to find an algorithm which determines n and has runtime polynomial in |P| + |Q|, so, this 
problem seems hard. This is also referred to as discrete logarithm problem (DLP) where “adding is 
easy on elliptic curve but undoing is hard”, (Tottanesce 2012). 
 
Using a multiplicative group of points on an elliptic curve the ECDH protocol works as follows 
 
1. Node A and node B agree on an elliptic curve E over a Field Fq and a base-point P∈E/ Fq. 
 
2. A generates a random secret kA and computes PA = kAP. 
 







4. A and B exchange PA and PB. 
 
5. A and B compute PAB = kaPB= kbPA 
 
The secret kA and kB is a random value ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, where n is the order of the group generated by P 
(Gajbhiya, Karmakar and Sharma, 2015) and are exchanged over  non secure channel without revealing 
identity of the secret (Wong, Ramamurthy and Zou, 2006).  
 
4.6 Mutual Authentication Scheme  
 
As mentioned above, the AODV is used as reference to compare the proposed scheme by modifying 
AODV. The standard AODV is compared with trusted AODV that has the proposed scheme embedded, 
to draw a comparison and validate the findings. There are three types of messages RREQ, RREP, and 
RERR defined by AODV protocol. To implement the proposed trusted scheme, there has been a 
modification made to the RREQ message at destination node and RREP at the source node to request 
corresponding values for authentication before any data exchange. 
 
4.6.1 AODV Authentication process at Destination Node D 
 
This section describes how AODV can be used to implement the proposed mutual authentication 
scheme. When a source node S wishes to communicate with destination Node D, and doesn’t have a 
route to destination node D, it sends a RREQ. In the normal AODV operation the destination node 






the last action performed is a |Send Reply| message sent. After the AODV operation is complete and 
before any data communication is performed by both nodes, the authentication and authorization stage 
begins which concludes the first phase of the proposed scheme. 
 
According to this stage, the destination node requests trust values from source S and all its neighbour 
nodes. Once the trust values are received from all the corresponding neighbour nodes of S then the trust 
values are evaluated to calculate final trust value. The node is authenticated if the trust value is equal to 
and higher than the values received from all neighbours, and authentication fails if the trust value is 
low. The same process is repeated by the source node S to authenticate destination node by requesting 
source and its neighbours trust values recorded for the source node. 
 
The AODV process at destination node is shown in figure 4.6. The figure 4.6 presents the difference 
between standard and trusted AODV process. The trusted AODV requests the trust values from source 
neighbour node and if authentication is successful, a reply is sent in the form of RREP message. Before 
any data is exchanged the ECDH algorithm is implemented. The additional steps are shown at the end 
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4.6.2 AODV Authentication process at Source Node S 
 
The source node S waits for a route reply RREP after sending a RREQ in order to communicate with 
the destination node D. When it received a RREP from destination node D, the source node S then 
repeats the same process performed by the destination node. Source node also requests the trust values 
from all the neighbours of the destination node. Upon receiving the trust values of destination 
neighbours, the source compares the trust values and authenticates the destination node to establish 
communication. As both nodes S and D have no security association with one another to exchange data, 
hence the proposed scheme provides that layer of security by using trust to authenticate destination 
node. The figure 4.10 shows the steps in AODV, when the Dynamic Trust Based Scheme is 
implemented. The steps highlighted in the end, where the source receives the RREP, it requests the 














































Figure 4.10 Source Node DFD Standard versus Trust AODV 
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The last step of the proposed scheme is the key exchange mechanism to encrypt messages using secret 
keys. The keys are exchanged using Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This would ensure the data is 
encrypted and could not be intercepted or tempered with by eaves dropper between source S and 




Different stages of the algorithm and details of its functionalities are discussed in this chapter. As the 
proposed scheme provides a foundation for MANET routing protocol to implement a layer of security 
that enables a distributed, trusted and secure key exchange algorithm when the network initialises, 
therefore, this scheme can be implemented on various other MANET routing protocol as well. The aim 
was to provide a scheme that does not rely on a specific routing protocol apart from few modifications 
presented in this chapter. As mentioned above that the proposed scheme is not dependent on any 
specific routing protocol, therefore, it could be extended to any Adhoc routing protocol by making few 
modifications to packet header.  


















In this chapter, the details of the implementation of the proposed scheme are presented. This includes 
the methods adopted and implemented using AODV routing protocol and the evaluation through 
simulation with Network Simulator NS2.33 using Ubuntu 16.04 (NS2 Documentation, No date). The 
simulation results are evaluated extensively under varying network conditions such as mobility, 
network size area and node count.  The simulation environment and different parameters used to 
generate results are also discussed. The full TCL, CBR and scenarios file is attached in appendices D. 
 
NS2 is used to test the proposed scheme because of its support for various protocols. It is open source 
and available on Windows, Linux and MAC platforms. However, it uses Cygwin as a platform for 
implementation in Windows. There are active forums; and help and support is available online (NS2 
documentation, no date). NS2 is a simulation tool that provides better support and documentation for 
its users to help understand how protocols work and interact with different topologies. The underlying 
language, it is built on is, Object Oriented C++ however, an additional language TCL is used for 
scripting, which makes it relatively less efficient and difficult to understand (Henderson 2011).  
 
5.1 Simulation Environment 
 
There were two main parts when implementing the trust algorithm in NS2. Firstly, modifying the 






implementing them in TCL to run the simulation. The source code mainly involved using Hello packet 
and transmitting and receiving of RREQ and RREP packets. The Hello packets were used to carry the 
parameters values needed to work-out the dynamic trust of neighbour node, while RREQ and RREP 
packets were used to carry the trust values for mutual authentication. The RREQ packets were used to 
request and RREP were used to send the trust value between communicating pair nodes. The code is 
designed as efficiently as possible. This is achieved by making the use of online libraries and code re-
use in form of modifying AODV member functions. As highlighted previously, one of the reasons for 
selecting NS-2 is the online resources and help. By code re-use we mean that the original code 
designed for RREQ and RREP designed for AODV was modified to carry the trust information. The 
snippet of the code requesting and sending trust information in the form of TREQ and TREP is given in 
the appendix E. 
 
To test the proposed security scheme it is implemented in NS2 using Tool Command Language (TCL) 
script, to build the network scenario and using CBR as traffic generator. Varying the number of nodes, 
speed, cover area and simulation time are some of parameters used to test the proposed scheme.  
 
Node in MANET could be laptops, PDA’s, cell phone and any other device using wireless technology.   
The simulation environment is NS2 and the detail parameters are listed in the section 6 in chapter 5. A 
wireless channel using 802.11 as MAC protocol is used to run the proposed scheme in the simulation. 









5.1.1 Mobility Model and Date Rate 
 
The mobility model used is Random Waypoint Mobility and the speed details are shown in the table 
6.1 in the next chapter. There are different numbers of nodes used with varying parameters to analyse 
and test the outcome. The details are listed in the table 6.1 and 6.3. The date rate is set to 11Mb. The 
simulation covers the area between minimum x=400 and y=400. 
 
5.1.2 Malicious Nodes 
 
Nodes that intentionally drop data packets instead of forwarding them are known as malicious nodes. 
They are introduced to the network to test and analyse how standard AODV reacts to these nodes as 
compared to AODV running trusted scheme. The TCL script below from Appendix-C, shows which 
nodes are acting as malicious in the network having 20 nodes.    
 
# Adding malicious nodes  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(15) set ragent_] malicious" // Node 15 is set as malicious 
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(25) set ragent_] malicious" // Node 25 is set as malicious 
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(35) set ragent_] malicious" // Node 35 is set as malicious 
 
Algorithm 5.1 Malicious nodes TCL script 
 
Also, to test the proposed scheme against Denial of Service attacks such as Blackhole and Greyhole 






receives. The number of malicious node and their index is given in the table 6.2. When the network 
initialises and nodes start to communicate, the proposed scheme is expected to workout trust for each 
node in phase-one and identifies malicious nodes in the network. The proposed scheme successfully 
workout the trust threshold and dynamic trust threshold of all nodes as demonstrated and shown in 
results section. If the trust threshold of a node is less than the static trust and dynamic trust threshold, 
then those nodes are classed as malicious and excluded from routing. 
 
5.2 Scheme Design 
 
The routing protocol as mentioned above is AODV. Simulation scenario is designed to test the 
proposed scheme in the presence of a malicious node. When the TCL script is executed the network 
animator called NAM displays the layout of nodes in the simulation window and console generating 
output and displaying results. 
 
The protocols is initiated when a source node send a RREQ. The data flow diagram in figure 5.1 shows 
how the proposed scheme is initiated using AODV as routing protocol. It also shows the very first step 
of ADOV operation, to find route from source to destination. The AODV is modified to implement the 








                     Figure 5.1 AODV Operation of Route Request 
 
5.2.1 Trust metrics exchange 
 
All nodes operating in promiscuous mode are listening to packets sent and received by all neighbour 
nodes. When the simulation begins and nodes start communicating, source node checks, if it has a route 
to destination, and if it doesn’t have a route it broadcasts a RREQ. Destination nodes also known as 






All nodes maintain a trust table and calculate the trust values of its neighbour and along with the trust 
value, calculated and recorded by a node, it also sends the value to its neighbours every time a hello 
message is sent.  
 
The communication between neighbour nodes is carried using hello packets. The metrics used to 
calculate dynamic trust are also exchanged through hello packets in order to avoid increasing network 
traffic then absolutely necessary. The use of hello packet to carry the metric information also enabled 
us to update such values each time a hello packet is sent; hence the trust values are automatically 
updated. This endorses the initial statement that the scheme is self-configuring and gets itself rectified 
automatically. The code in Appendix-E shows how the hello packet is modified to carry various 
metrics. 
Once the trust table is populated with its trust values and trust values received from all neighbours 
regarding every neighbour, then the node is able to calculate its own and trust threshold of all 
neighbours using equation 4.8 in section 4. The average trust is used to calculate the trust of node. The 
node is considered trust worthy if the trust threshold is greater than the dynamic threshold or static 
trust.  
 
Modifications have been made to Hello Packets structure to exchange Trust Threshold value and other 
parameters such as nodes density, two-hop neighbours, energy and mobility as mentioned in section 
4.3. Hello packet in AODV uses the route reply (RREP) packet format to send hello messages to 
neighbours (Bhanot and Chaudhary, 2017). Hello messages are broadcasted using the RREP packet 







Destination Address Node’s IP address 
Destination Sequence number Latest sequence number of sending node 
Hop Count 0 
Life Time ALLOWED_HELLO_LOSS X HELLO_INTERVAL 
 
Table 5.1 Hello packet parameters 
 
The figure 5.2 below shows the standard AODV hello packet structure whereas the figure 5.3 shows 
the modified hello packet of the AODV. 
 














Modified Hello packet format is appended below with added fields highlighted: 
 




















The Appendix-E shows the C++ source code used to modify and implement the trusted AODV RREQ, 
RREP and modified hello packets in NS2. The code also includes the mutual authentication process of 




Mobility is implemented using Random Way Point mobility model in NS2 (NS2 documentation, no 
Date). The node speed is calculated in meter per second, varying between 5 (min) and 20 (max). 
Scenarios were created by applying values using ‘Setdest’ functionality in NS2, a built-in method for 
generating scenarios. Node destination and speed are provided as input to measure speed. The position 
of nodes is updated only when there is change in the destination. The current speed is calculated from 





Energy model in NS2 is used to implement energy and access energy of nodes during simulation. It is a 
key element in Adhoc network. Node has an initial value in the energy model in NS2, which represents 
the level of energy a node has at initialisation (beginning of the simulation). It is known as 
initialEnergy_. For every packet a node sends and receives, it has an energy usage. The packet 







When the simulation starts, the energy_ is set to initialEnergy_ which is then decremented for every 
transmission and reception of packets at the node. No more packets can be received or transmitted by 
the node, when the energy level at the node goes down to zero. The energy is assigned in NS2 by using 
parameters showed in the table 5.2. 
 
 




Type of Energy Model EnergyModel NS2.33Built-in 
rxPower Power for receiving one packet Power in watts 
(ex 0.2) 
35.28e-3 
txPower Power for receiving one packet Power in watts 
(ex 0.1) 
31.32e-3 

















5.5 Dynamic Threshold Simulation  
 
Once all the nodes have calculated the average trust values for its neighbours, this value is used as 
input to calculate the average trust threshold. We have presented in detail, in analytical model section, 
various parameters and the mathematical formulas or equations to calculate those parameters. The 
dynamic threshold can be computed using the threshold values of all parameters. The average trust 
value is required for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, it gives us a dynamic value based on network conditions at a particular time after the network is 
initialised. The threshold value is obtained by taking all five parameters into account therefore; it is 
referred to dynamic threshold value, as it is obtained dynamically. It can be used to measure the trust 
level of each node by comparing the static average trust value with dynamic threshold value.  
 
Secondly, it is used to authenticate peer nodes prior to any data communication. All the neighbours of 
source and destination nodes trust values are requested by the corresponding peers. The destination 
requests average trust values of the source’s neighbours and source requests the average trust values of 
the destination’s neighbours. This enables both communication nodes to get first hand trust information 
about their corresponding peer and thus provides an additional layer of security. The additional layer is 
used to mitigate against some of the known form of attacks such as Blackhole, Greyhole and 
Wormhole. The details of these types of attacks are discussed in section 4.  Figure 5.4 shows the flow 







             
 







The details of how the proposed scheme is implemented using AODV protocol and the test results are 
presented in this chapter. We tested the proposed scheme using various parameters using NS2 
simulation tool. The reason for the selection of NS2 and various underline resources used to implement 


























The performance of the proposed scheme is discussed in this chapter. The tests are conducted using 
normal AODV having varying number of malicious nodes running without using a security or trusted 
algorithm compared to AODV using the proposed dynamic trusted scheme.  
 
The tests were conducted to check the performance of the standard AODV compared to Trusted 
AODV. Standard AODV was used as a reference to check whether the Trusted AODV can mitigate 
against malicious attacks and what are the performance impacts. In order to ensure that the scheme is 
tested in a diverse environment and with a variety of metrics, the simulation tests results were 
generated by taking different scenarios and parameters into account. The test results indicate that 
Trusted ADOV can successfully thwart packet dropping attacks however, there is a performance 
overhead. 
 
6.1 Performance Metrics 
 
The performance of Trusted AODV evaluated using the following metrics:  
 
 Throughput:  It is the amount of data (bit or packets) transferred between source and 









  Throughput x
StartTimeStopTime
dta ReceiveSize of Da

                  …..………………Equation 6.1 
 
 Routing Overhead: Routing overhead represents any control packets required by protocol to 
perform a specific task. It is therefore, the sum of all the control packets sent during the total 
simulation time. 
 
RO = Sum of the Total Number of AODV packets sent      …………………..Equation 6.2 
 
 Average End-to-end Delay: It is the average time taken by packet to reach from source to the 
destination. This includes the delay caused by retransmission (delay at MAC level), buffering 
(during route discovery) and queuing delay (interface queues). 
 
                         ……………………….Equation 6.3 
nr  : Time when data packet was sent 
ns : Time when data packet was received 















𝑥100                                   …………..…………….Equation 6.4 
 
The TPRi represents the total number of packets received by the DBR destination i, and TPSk, 




S: Represents set of CBR source  
 
D: Represents set of CBR destination 
 
Packets parameters such as packets forwarded, received, sent and dropped are also presented to 
compare the performance of standard AODV with trusted AODV. Two scenarios having 20 and 50 
nodes are generated using parameters listed in the tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, 6.4 respectively, to compare 
and evaluate the metrics. The using NS2 simulator is used the standard and trust AODV. The details of 
the complete scenarios and test bed created are listed in the appendix A-D. The performance metrics 
are obtained and analysed when the Dynamic Trust scheme is run by varying the number of nodes and 








6.2 Scenario-One (20 Nodes):  Standard AODV VS Trusted AODV 
 
 Node Mobility Parameters  
Two scenarios are generated using different parameters. Scenario-one mobility and size parameters are 
listed in the table 6.1 to compare and evaluate the metrics obtained using NS2 simulator. Identical 
scenarios are run using standard AODV and dynamic trusted scheme in the presence of malicious 
nodes and the results obtained are presented in the section below. 
 
The Random Waypoint Mobility (RWM) model was used to generate mobility. Parameters listed in 
table 6.1 were used to generate mobility in NS2. The complete file is attached in appendix B. In this 
scenario the normal AODV is used as a routing protocol without any trust scheme. In order to obtain 
and compare results compared to AODV using the proposed dynamic trust scheme, malicious nodes 
are added to the network. As described in the table 6.2, there are three malicious nodes introduced. Any 
data traffic that comes in the path of malicious nodes will be dropped. This type of attack is called 
Grayhole attack which is a type of Denial-of-Service where nodes drop data packets that it receives. 
The table 6.1 shows node properties and simulation system environment and table 6.2 shows all the 
parameters and their corresponding values. 
 
Machine Specification 





HP Probook 450 Intel Core i5 2.20 GHz 8.0 GB 166 MHz Ubuntu 16.04 
 
 














































RWP  20 3 400x400      250    5-20      0-100 180 
 




Nodes: Total number of nodes in the network 
 
Min Speed: Minimum speed. 
 
Max Speed: Maximum speed a node can achieve. Represented in meter per second 
 
Pause Time: The interval of time where the node stops any movements. It is represented in 
milliseconds. 
 
Dimensions: The area of the network in x and y dimensions. 
 








 Parameters Specifying Traffic Patterns 
The data parameters are shown in table 6.3, list all the parameters and their corresponding values used 


















1 1 2 CBR 0.2 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 2.556 
Approx. 
2 4 5 CBR 0.2 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 56.333 
Approx. 
3 4 6 CBR 0.2 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 146.9651 
Approx. 
4 6 7 CBR 0.2 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 55.634 
Approx. 
 














Conn No: Represent the maximum number of connections 
 
Sink Node: Representing node that receives the data. 
 
Send Rate: The interval after which data is sent 
 
Packet Size: The size of each data packet. 
 
Max Pkts: Represent the maximum number of packets 
 
Conn Time: Simulation time at which two nodes connect to exchange data. 
 
6.2.1 Performance Scenario-One 
 
 Packet Statistics 
One of the scenarios tested was, varying the number of nodes in the network. The packet statistics 
include packet sent, received, forwarded and dropped. The key characteristic of the trust based schemes 
is that each node observes its neighbour, in other words, the nodes operate in promiscuous mode. All 






The figure 6.1 shows the packet statistics obtained when the network is running standard AODV 
compared to Dynamic Trusted AODV protocol and both having three malicious nodes as adversary to 
simulate an attack in the form of packet dropping. The results show total packets sent, total packets 
received, total packets dropped and packets forwarded.  
 
The purpose of gathering packet statistics is to gain an insight into the network when its running using 
AODV with and without trusted algorithm, given the same set of conditions. For the purpose of the 
testing, malicious nodes are introduced in the network. These nodes drop any packets that they receive. 
The key purpose of packet statistics is to capture the malicious activities in terms of the number of 
packet dropped by malicious nodes. This is an indicator of how good or bad the response of trusted 
AODV is compared to standard AODV, as the later is used as a reference to test the proposed scheme. 
The response is measured by comparing the difference between the total number of total packets sent 
and received. The difference between them gives us the total number of dropped packets. The packets 
dropped indicate the network has misbehaving and malicious nodes. By comparing the results it is 
realized that ratio of packet drop is high in standard AODV protocol as compared to trusted AODV. 
This is due to the trusted algorithm, which makes the network more resistant to packet drop attacks. 









      
Figure 6.1 Packet Statistics     
 
The packet statistics show the total number of packets sent by trusted and standard AODV. As shown 
in the figure 6.1, the number of packets received and forwarded by trusted scheme is relatively higher. 
The reason behind this is that, the trusted scheme is preventing malicious nodes from taking part in 
routing and also preventing packet dropping. For the same reason the number of packet dropped is 

































Using scenario-one, the Throughput obtained is shown in figure 6.2. When data is transmitted from one 
place to another in a network, throughput is the amount of data moved successfully from one point to 
another in a given period of time. Since, malicious nodes are introduced to the network therefore; the 
network throughput in case of standard AODV is as expected. Malicious nodes in the network are 
dropping any data packets when they traverse the network and as normal AODV has no protection 
against malicious nodes, as a result, it has low throughput as shown in the figure 6.2. On the contrary, 
trusted AODV has a relatively higher throughput compared to standard due to fact that the dynamic 
trust scheme is mitigating against malicious dropping packets. 
 
 
             





















The most important of all is the performance metric is the throughput, which is referred to as the 
number of packets successfully received per unit time. It is an important indicator of the performance 
and quality of network connection. The results show high throughput when trusted AODV is run 
against standard AODV. This indicates that even though the trusted algorithm has high overhead and 
end-to-end delay but it has high throughput. 
 
 Routing Overhead 
 
Routing overhead represent any control packets required by protocol to perform a specific task. The 
higher the number of these packets the lager the overhead become. These packets are required for 
network communication. Performance is critical for any organization and may be a priority but 
implementing security means slowing down and adding latency. It is therefore very important to 
measure the overhead of any scheme to find the right balance evaluate the reliance in AODV to carry 
the trust information and other metrics used to calculate the dynamic trust threshold.  
 
The proposed scheme depends upon additional control packets to be sent between nodes to implement 
the trusted algorithm. The routing overhead produced are shown in the figure 6.3, it shows the 









Figure 6.3 Routing Overhead 
 
The dynamic trusted algorithm implemented using AODV as apparent from the packets statistics is 
showing positive results. But majority of the security techniques comes with some kind of performance 






























 Average End-to-End Delay 
 
Figure 6.4 shows Average End-to-End delay using parameters from scenario-one. The time taken by a 
packet to be transmitted from one point to another i.e. from source to the destination across the network 
is called End-to-End delay. This is the transmitting delay, propagation delay and queuing time of 
packets combined. The results show that there is slight higher delay due to trust based scheme running 
in the background and packets are routed to avoid any malicious nodes in the path. The standard 
AODV has less delay which is due to less overhead compared to trusted AODV. 
 
 
                                                           






















The overhead of the proposed trust scheme can also be represented by calculating the average End-to-
end, as it is the time taken for a packet to travel from source to the destination. This is also an important 
performance metric because excessive delay can affect the throughput. Another consequence of a 
higher delay is that it could result in breach of TTL limit and ultimately the re-transmission of the 
packet. One of the functionality of the trust scheme algorithm is to identify the malicious nodes in the 
network. Once it is identified, the malicious nodes are excluded from routing, which means re-routing 
of packets thorough trusted nodes. This has a direct effect on time taken by packets to reach its 
destination. The running of trusted algorithm introduces the latency due to avoiding malicious nodes in 
its routing path and can increase the hop-count as results as well.  
 
 
 Packet Delivery Ratio  
 
The result for packet delivery ratio is shown in figure 6.5 below. This metric indicates the performance 
of the proposed trusted scheme after analysing all other performance metrics. This metric represent the 
ratio of the number of packets received by the destination to the number of packets sent by the 
destination. The packet delivery ratio is higher in secure AODV then standard as shown in the results 
section, which proves that the trust scheme is out performing. This is despite the relatively high 
overhead and end-to-end delay. It can therefore be concluded that although implementation of the 
trusted scheme comes with performance overhead but providing the necessary security to the MANET, 







The ratio at which the packets are delivered in the network is low for standard as compared to trusted 
AODV. The standard AODV has no defence against malicious nodes dropping data packets which has 
a direct adverse effect on packet delivery ratio. 
  
 
                                           


































6.3 Scenario–Two (50 Nodes):  Standard AODV vs Trusted AODV  
 
 Nodes Mobility Parameters  
In this scenario, the total numbers of nodes are increased to 50. Using identical parameters with 
increased number of nodes, the AODV protocol is run using Dynamic Trusted Scheme and normal 
AODV to compare the results. The individual results are shown below: 
 
 







































RWP  50   3 400x400      250    5-20      0-100 180 
 
          Table 6.4 Node Movement and Network Size 
 
Nodes 15, 25 and 35 are malicious nodes in the network that drops data packet it receives. As shown in 
the table 6.4 the simulation area is 400x400 both x and y axis.  
 
 Parameters Specifying Traffic Patterns 
 
The data parameters are similar to what was selected in scenario-one apart from this scenario have 






various statistics collected between AODV with and without Trusted Scheme. Number of maximum 
connections are 5 and CBR is used as an application layer protocol. Table 6.5 show all the parameters 


















1 1 2 CBR 0.1 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 2.556 
Approx. 
2 4 5 CBR 0.1 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 56.333 
Approx. 
3 4 6 CBR 0.1 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 146.9651 
Approx. 
4 6 7 CBR 0.1 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 55.634 
Approx. 
5 7 8 CBR 0.1 
Approx. 
UDP 512 10000 29.546 
Approx. 
 










6.3.1 Performance Scenario-Two 
 
In the coming section, the results are analysed that are obtained using application data and mobility 
parameters of scenario-two. The statistics are again similar to what we had in scenario-one which 
includes packet data, throughput, routing overhead, end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio. 
 Packet Statistics 
The packet statistics are shows in detail in figure 6.6 below. The results show a visible variation when 
the AODV is run using trusted scheme and without trust scheme. It can be observed from the results 
below that as the network grows and the number of nodes increases, the trusted scheme is still able to 
identify malicious nodes. As a result, the total number of packets forwarded is higher in standard 
ADOV with no trusted scheme running. The same pattern can be observed with packets dropped and 
packets received, where the number of packets dropped is higher and packets received is much lower in 








      
Figure 6.6 Packet Statistics 
 
 
 Routing Overhead 
Routing overheads reflect the use of number of packets generated using standard as compared to 
trusted AODV. Any control packets in the form of broadcast or unicast, whether it’s a RREQ or RREP 
packets sent over the network, the result is an overhead. Thus, the higher number of control packets 
means a higher overhead. When the routing overheads of standard AODV are compared against trusted 

























The results in figure 6.7 show higher overhead due to the fact that the proposed trusted scheme relies 
on AODV protocol for its implementation. Thus, excess packets are required for the proposed trusted 
protocol to execute and provide the essential security.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 Routing Overhead 
 
 
 Throughput  
The figure 6.8 shows the throughput obtained using parameters of scenario-two. Malicious nodes are 
introduced to the network again in this scenario to compare the difference in throughput between 
trusted and untrusted AODV environment. The results show a significant drop in the throughput when 
there is no protection against malicious nodes. On the other hand, the throughput turns out to be 

























by providing high security measures. The results presented in figure 6.8, shows that the trusted AODV 





    Figure 6.8 Network Throughput 
 
 
 End-to-End Delay 
The figure 6.9 shows Average End-to-End delay using parameters from scenario-two. The end-to-end 
delay is higher when AODV is run with the Trusted Scheme as compared to normal AODV. The higher 
delay is due to the overhead caused by the trusted scheme. The AODV performance is adversely 
affected in term of end-to-end delay but as a result the network is more secure. As shown in figure 6.9, 























       
 





 Packet Delivery Ratio 
The results for packet delivery ratio listed in figure 6.10, shows that trusted scheme is preventing 
malicious nodes from dropping packets. On the contrary, it can be observed that the packet delivery 
ratio in standard AODV is comparatively low, as there no measures in place, to counter the threats of 

























             
 
                                
Figure 6.10 Packet Delivery Ratio  
 
 
6.4 Static versus Dynamic Trust 
 
As the detailed numerical analysis presented in chapter 4, demonstrated how the dynamic trust scheme 
can result in less false positives. In this section, some of the results obtained during simulations by 
varying number of nodes using static trust model and the proposed dynamic trust model are presented. 
Both schemes are run side by side and the throughput and packet delivery ratio is recorded to analyse 




























 That the dynamic trust scheme not only results in less false positives but also shows better 
performance.  
 
 To draw a comparison between the static and dynamic trust model, to prove that the trust 
calculated dynamically using the proposed trust algorithm can result in high throughput. 
The graph below shows a higher throughput for dynamic model then static model. This also shows that 
although the static trust model is defending against malicious nodes in the network however, using a 
dynamic model can increase the detection rate, reduce false positives. The results also reflect the claim 





























Similarly, figure 6.12 presents the packet delivery ratio between static and dynamic model using 
varying number of node. Again the results show a higher percentage of packet delivered using dynamic 




Figure 6.12 Static verses Dynamic Trust Model Packet Delivery Ratio  
 
Although the scheme can be successfully implemented to give the desire results however, there are 
certain limitations in terms of the level of security it can provide. The scheme can defend against 
Blackhole and Greyhole attacks but it can provide limited protection against collaborative attacks such 




























The reason for selection to use Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman schemes is explained in the chapter 4. No 
end-to-end security can be fully achieved without using cryptographic algorithm. The use and 
implementation of cryptographic techniques has always been challenging in MANET. It is one of the 
key areas that have been extensively explored and many solutions have been proposed and the research 
continues till this time. ECDH is selected for data encryption as it suits MANET due to its efficiency 
and provides more security with smaller key size. 
 
6.5 Phase-two Performance Evaluation 
 
NS2.33 simulator is used to simulate phase-one of the proposed scheme is presented in this section 
along with phase-two, which represents the performance overhead of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange is also presented. The merits and reason for the selection of the metrics are discussed in 
detail in the above section. The calculations when ECDH is implemented are presented in this section 
as well. 
 
The metrics presented to test the performance of the proposed scheme is based on data packets and do 
not include the control and security message. Thus, the statistics represent only phase-one of the 
scheme, hence we explore overhead caused when ECDH is implemented in phase-two. 
 
According to (Wong, Ramamurthy and Zou, 2006) and given the steps shown in section 4, there are 9 
steps required to generate and exchange keys for ECDH algorithm. This means additional 9 packets are 
needed to the total number of packets in phase-one. The first step is peer nodes generate random 






of public key from its corresponding peer computes shared key. Therefore, there is no significant effect 
on the throughput when ECDH is implemented.  
 
Lastly, the overhead caused by ECDH, if EC key size of 160 bits is used between peer nodes, this key 
length gives us 80 bits of equivalent symmetric key security. Only one cycle is needed to exchange the 
keys as an encryption key of 80 bits will produce 160 bits (key size), where each data packet size is 512 
bits.  
 
This implies that the ECDH can be applied as key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key. 
The secret key produced is symmetric type and can be used to encrypt data between communicating 
peer nodes. The advance and more secure version of data encryption scheme such as AES and DES, 
explained in the literature review section, can be used to ensure secure data exchange. Data encryption 
can prevent against attacks such as Rushing (Rifquddin and Sukiswo, 2015) and Wormhole (Anju and 




The performance Standard AODV is compared with the proposed trust scheme under varying 
conditions such as number of nodes, mobility and dimensions. The dynamic threshold scheme 
combined with mutual trust authentication and ECDH scheme resulted in some of the most promising 
systems. This is due to the reason that dynamic trust scheme makes the system self-configuring and 
robust, while mutual authentication avoids the difficult challenge of authentication without any 






expensive public key infrastructure and key distribution techniques. An important result of this thesis is 
that the area of trust based security in MANETs has been explored, where a methodology was adopted 
and modified to calculate trust dynamically that offers a platform to authenticate nodes, encrypt data 

























      In this chapter, the conclusion of the thesis, brief summary of the research findings, critical analysis 
and future research is presented. The dynamic trust based scheme is the novel way of defining trust in 
MANET by using various parameters most relevant to MANET conditions, to segregate malicious 
nodes. The novel method of mutual trust scheme provides the authentication between source and 
destination nodes for confidential data communication. 
The dynamic nature of MANET makes the use of conventional security schemes such as secret and 
public key cryptography more challenging and prevents the design of one-size-fits-all solution (Kumar, 
and Mishra, 2012). Due to the lack of infrastructure in MANET, only the nodes in the network can be 
relied upon to observe and judge whether a particular node is trusted or compromised. Therefore, the 
scheme proposed in this research is robust and encompasses various aspects of security. To solve the 
security problem, specification are kept as general as possible and it is ensured that the scheme can be 
adapted to accommodate other protocols and it can be used for various applications. Hence, the scheme 
can be applied to a large number of applications using MANET.  
The scheme not only allows the nodes to authenticate its-self but the security is implemented 
throughout the network and is scaled as the network grows through the efficient trust based scheme. 
This signifies that not only the security of individual nodes is important but the security of the network 
as whole is of paramount importance as well. The implications of multilayer security on the nodes in 






limitations as well and cannot be ignored. These limitations can change the way nodes behave and can 
massively impact the behaviour in an adverse way (Zhao et al 2012).  
 
Security is essential for a number of reasons to keep valuables safe.  We have started to see more 
security measures becoming mandatory at various levels in IT. In MANET, the security of nodes and 
securing communication between nodes is equally important, to safeguard the data (Perrig et al, 2002). 
MANET is the future of communication and can be used in a number of important applications. Its 
ability of nodes to form Adhoc network in the absence of any infrastructure, makes it popular research 
area. One of the biggest challenges faced by MANET is security (Hu et al 2002). MANET protocols 
were designed without taking security into considerations. Due to its distinct features such as lack of 
conventional security infrastructure, no centralised mechanism, constantly changing topology and open 
wireless medium makes MANETs more vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, unlike their wired 
counterpart, a different approach is needed to secure MANET (Eladi et al 2013). 
 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
 
The main goal of this thesis has been to design and implement a security algorithm using trust based 
schemes and to achieve the objectives of this research, that are dynamically implementing trusted 
algorithm, identifying trusted and malicious nodes, authenticate peer communicating nodes and data 
encryption between end nodes.  The work carried out in this research describes the specific security 






trust dynamically, as a possible solution. This was proposed as a new concept after analysing several 
trust based schemes and comparing them. 
 
In the initial stage of this research, MANET characteristics, protocols and other related features were 
thoroughly reviewed. In the second stage of the literature review, the network security was studied in 
detail (Juwad and Al-Raweshidy, 2008; Hu, John and Perrig, 2002; Perrig et al, 2002 ; Hu, Perrig and 
Johnson, 2005). This included general network and communication security and MANET specific 
security. Main part of the network and communication security included cryptographic techniques, trust 
based schemes, secure routing protocols and common security goals (Hinds et al, 2012).  The common 
types of security attacks and the attacks that were more specific to MANET were analysed. Finally, 
part of the literature review was to conduct a detailed analysis of the completed work to secure 
MANET, using various trust and cryptographic techniques (Zhao et al 2012). 
 
A number of trust based schemes have been designed that allow the detection of malicious nodes in 
MANET and mitigate various forms of security attacks specific to MANET. Majority of the trust 
schemes have used static and pre-determined values to calculate trust threshold in the network nodes 
(Balakrishnan, Deng, Varshney, 2005; Khan et al, 2015:  Buttyan and Hubaux, 2000; Zhong et al 2003; 
Buchegger and Le-Boudec, 2002; Jhaveri, 2013). Their approach to trust calculation was that nodes 
listening in promiscuous mode to all packets sent and received by neighbours and then compared that 
trust against the static threshold. Although, this is the most common and popular approach but there 
could be a number of factors that can cause dropping of the packets by various nodes. These factors 
reflect a true MANET environment. It is important, that these factors are taken into consideration while 






dynamically calculate the trust threshold. Secondly, using the trust as a framework, the proposed 
scheme applied a second layer of security by presenting a novel way of mutual authentication between 
peer nodes. 
 
In this research, AODV routing protocol has been used to implement the dynamic trusted algorithm. A 
novel method has been introduced by adopting the research in (Khan et al 2015; Buttyan and Hubaux, 
2000; Zhong et al 2003; Buchegger and Le-Boudec, 2002 and Jhaveri, 2013), in calculating the trust 
scheme. The first stage of the trust calculation involved working out the trust value of each node. All 
nodes listening to the neighbours nodes and work out their trust value. Once, every node has the trust 
value, a threshold value is needed, to work-out the trust of each node. The common approach that has 
been in used in the previous research is to use, a predetermined static value. A novel approach of 
calculating a dynamic trust threshold value was adopted that included parameters, most relevant to 
MANET environment. The parameters used are one-hop neighbours, two-hop neighbours, trust, energy 
and mobility. The dynamic trust threshold value of a node is compared with its actual trust value 
observed by neighbour node to calculate final trust. These parameters play a very crucial role in, how 
the nodes behave in MANET. The reason for the selection of these parameters and the justification for 
using dynamic scheme are discussed in detailed in chapter 3.  
 
The trust framework is paramount for identifying malicious nodes in the network therefore; the 
dynamic trust scheme is used to implement that framework. Once the trust is established the second 
layer of security is invoked. This is referred to as mutual trust authentication, whereby peer 
communicating nodes request trust from the neighbour nodes. This step is invoked by source and 






when source receives a RREP, it requests trust values of destination node from the destination’s 
neighbour nodes before initiating any data communication. The same process is repeated at the 
destination node when it receives a RREQ. Destination node also send a request to source’s neighbour 
nodes, to get the trust value of source node, the trust value that is already calculated through the 
dynamic trust scheme. 
 
7.2 Proposed Scheme Evaluation 
 
There have been various trust based schemes designed to secure MANET. Some of the schemes have 
been discussed in detail in the literature review section, majority of them have been designed not taking 
MANET dynamic nature into account. The dynamic approach has been adopted to calculate the trust 
threshold mainly, to distinguish between misbehaving and malicious node. A misbehaving node in 
MANET is where the node is partially or not participating in routing process at all. Normally, the 
compromised node can engage in many types of malicious activities (Jhaveri, 2012). For the 
simulation, this activity is recorded in the form of dropping packets otherwise these nodes will not be 
detected. The trust value is mostly dependent upon neighbour observations in promiscuous mode and if 
no data is forwarded by the corresponding node, the neighbour marks it down. But this behaviour of 
not forwarding data could be for a number of reasons. It could be either due to MANET specific 
environment or could be a malicious node whose security is compromised. As each node is working as 
router than wrongly excluding a node due to its misbehaving can result in false positive and affect 
network connectivity (Khan et al 2015). If such a node happens to be a destination or source node than 






process. The dynamic trust calculation takes the combined static and dynamic approach to make a clear 
distinction between malicious and misbehaving node. 
 
The parameters used to calculate trust dynamically are selected in-line with the MANET specific 
conditions. The parameters include one-hop neighbours, two-hop neighbours, trust, mobility and 
energy. The energy and mobility reflects the dynamic nature of MANET, as the nodes are mobile and 
the power resource is constantly depleting. The one-hop and two-hop is crucial information for trust 
calculation. This is also a constantly changing resource and plays an important role in determining the 
trust of a node dynamically. The details of all the metric and how they are calculated are presented in 
chapter 3 and 4 respectively. The analytical model presents the equations for calculating average trust, 
average trust threshold and dynamic trust threshold values. The dynamic trust threshold is derived by 
taking all the metrics into account and applying weights to each metric. The weights applied can be 
changed to fine tune the dynamic trust threshold depending on the applications.   
 
The scheme is implemented in the MANET environment with no predetermined trust hence all nodes 
are treated as having no trust at all (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. and Nordmark, E. 2004). The scheme 
is compatible with any MANET routing protocol and can be implemented in the network using routing 
protocol other than AODV. The reason for the selection of AODV as a routing protocol is, it’s being 
on-demand (Morshed et al 2010). In other words, it is a reactive routing protocol. There are two main 
types of Adhoc routing protocols called reactive and proactive. Proactive protocols are topology-based 
protocols that have high overheads and consume relatively more energy as compared to reactive 
protocols. This is due to the fact that the routing table needs to be deployed beforehand, that causes 






research would have been that the node consuming energy at a faster rate. Energy being one of the 
metric for calculating the dynamic trust threshold, therefore, a protocol that consumes less power has 
been the primary choice (Mohandas, Silas and Sam, 2013). The AODV has been used for testing, as 
it’s a reactive protocol it causes less overhead due to no routing tables are deployed beforehand. Hence 
this helped in reducing routing overhead and as a result it reduces the energy consumption and 
increasing the network lifetime (Gupta, and Sexena, 2010).   
 
Determining the trust level of new nodes and allowing them to become part of the network, so that, 
they can take part in routing and communication, is still a challenging issue. A novel method for 
authentication is proposed that enabled nodes to prove their identity prior to exchanging data with each 
other. In the proposed security scheme, the trust based scheme and the trust values are utilized for 
authentication and DHEC is used for key exchange and data encryption (Wang, Ramamurthy and Zou, 
2006).  
 
These schemes have some distinctive characteristics that support MANET decentralized and resource 
constraint environment. The proposed scheme is developed assuming no prior trust and association 
between nodes. This represents pure MANET (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. and Nordmark, E. 2004) 
and is one of the fundamental characteristics of MANET. Given this feature of MANET, any 
conventional security method is hard to implement. For instance, the use of various cryptographic 
techniques, such as PKI cannot be applied without having some prior security in place. This would be 
that nodes have some form of prior trust; identity verification, cryptographic keys storage, nodes 
authentication and authorization, KDC or CA allocation and access are some of the fundamental 






measures can address some of the security issues but does not represent pure MANET (Nikander, Ed. 
P., Kempf, J. and Nordmark, E. 2004). The proposed dynamic trust based scheme is implemented using 
pure MANET and this supports the primary goal of implementing security in MANET that has no prior 
security.   
 
In this research, an efficient way to support existing nodes leaving and joining the network has also 
been proposed. This is due to the fact that the nodes are mobile and the topology is constantly changing 
so there is a provision for new nodes joining the network and go through the trust and authentication 
process as shown in figure 6.1 (Cho, Swami and Chen, 2011).  
 
The proposed trust scheme achieves this by constantly updating the trust values regardless of whether 
it’s a new or existing node. Additionally, it is self-organizing as the trust values are evaluated against a 




























     
 
        Figure 7.1 New and Existing Node Joining the Network 
 
The mutual authentication scheme presented in the proposed trust model is a key contribution. In 
MANET, as other methods of authentication discussed in chapter 2, are hard to achieve but there is a 
need for authentication and it is paramount to obtain a degree of authentication before peer nodes 
initiate any data exchange (Zhao, et al 2012). The dynamic trust provides a platform, where there is no 
pre-established trust, to enable mutual trust authentication in the nodes. The trust from network 
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Figure 7.2 MANET Trust Stages 
 
The authentication scheme uses the underline AODV protocol to request the trust values from 
neighbour nodes of the corresponding peer nodes. This is achieved at the expense of routing overhead. 
There is a trade-off between achieving the security goal and network performance. The scheme does 
receive a performance hit by implementing the security but this performance overhead does not come 
as a surprise. The level of routing overhead can be argued and there is always room for improvement in 
terms of optimising the overall scheme but the primary goal had been security. We believe that 
although the scheme has performance overheads but it can be implemented without severely crippling 
the whole network. 
 
The scheme provides an efficient and secure mechanism for the distribution of keys between nodes 
over an insecure channel. The scheme offers encryption of data communication using keys that are 
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freshly generated by the communicating nodes. The keys are valid for the single session and fresh keys 
are generated for every new session initiation. This ensures that all the nodes, whether existing or new 
will undergo the process of trust evaluation and authentication.  
 
The scheme also deals with the inherent key escrow property in the context of MANET. We believe 
that our novel concept addresses the issue of Key Escrow, because no certificate authorities (CA) are 
used to generate and distribute keys. The use of CA has inherent issue when it comes to MANET. The 
primary role of CA is to deal with PKI infrastructure and cryptographic keys management such as keys 
generation, distribution and revocation makes it a key escrow (Hinds et al, 2012). In MANET, CA is 
faced with physical security, malicious attacks, bandwidth consumption, energy, availability, access 
control, mobility and no centralized mechanism. Availability is referred to when node acting as CA and 
cannot be accessed due to network partitioning, out of range, low power or compromised for any other 
reason where it is unable to render services to a legitimate node’s request (Zhao et al 2012).  
 
One of the properties of the proposed trust based scheme is that it is self-organizing. From pre-network 
initialisation stage where there is no trust to when the network is fully initialised, something we 
referred to post-network initialisation in this thesis. At this stage, the trust algorithm is invoked and 
trust is established among nodes. This process is completely self-configuring. This is an important 










   
The research deals with the question of calculating trust, using pure (Nikander, Ed. P., Kempf, J. and 
Nordmark, E. 2004) MANET features and how trust can be used to authenticate communicating peer 
nodes. This research proves, by demonstrating that the dynamic trust algorithm in MANET can be built 
unlike static trust, to identify malicious nodes. The proposed trust scheme not only reduces false 
positives but also has a higher throughput and packet delivery ratio. 
 
A novel way of authentication, referred to as mutual authentication, has been demonstrated and proved 
in this research. According to this scheme, the communicating nodes validated each other by requesting 
trust from their corresponding peer’s neighbour nodes. The trust values calculated as result of the 
dynamic scheme is used for authentication.   
 
7.4 Research Challenges 
 
There were various challenges faced during different stages while carrying out this research. The first 
stage was at literature review, when cryptographic and security schemes were analysed, it was realised 
that, a very deep level of understanding and mathematical background is needed to implement these 
algorithms. Learning these algorithms and achieving the required level of understanding was a daunting 
task. A lot of learning and practice was put in place, to understand and implement various 







NS2 simulator is used to implement and test the scheme. It is an open source and Linux based 
simulation tool however, it can be run in Windows environment using Cygwin.  Numerous operational, 
installation and performance issues were faced during the implementation stage of the research 
therefore; the idea of using Cygwin in Windows environment was eventually dropped. It was for the 
first time that Linux OS and Linux based applications were used. It was a huge learning curve to work 
on different versions of Linux operating systems to run the simulation tool. 
 
Modifying AODV code to implement the trust algorithm was the most challenging out of all the 
challenges faced during the research and it was very time consuming as well. There were number of 
problems that were ran into during designing, learning, understand, debugging and troubleshooting 
C++ code. NS2 is written in C++ and TCL programming language used as interpretation language. It is 
used to write simulation script in NS2. Every instruction in TCL is a command for the simulation 
program (Morshed et al 2010). There was a dual challenge of learning TCL and C++ to understand and 
implement our algorithm in NS2. 
 
7.5 Future Work  
 
The detection of malicious behaviour is a challenging task (Annarasi and Sevanesh, 2014). There could 
be other types of metrics used to detect these nodes such as count the number of generated packets for 
instance route requests RREQ. Another metric that can be used is to check the response time of nodes 
when they receive packets. Lastly, an acknowledgment method can be used whenever a packet is sent. 






in figure 7.3. When two neighbour nodes communicate, the receiving node send a reply in the form of 












        Figure 7.3 Acknowledgement Method 
 
 
Part of the future work would be to enhance the scheme to protect against collaborative attacks. These 
types of attacks are called Byzantine attacks that are against the routing protocols, in which two or more 
colluding routers attempt to disrupt routing operation by modifying, fabricating or dropping packets (Yu et al 
2001).  
 
The mutual authentication scheme proposed in this thesis can be secured using pairwise shared keys 
authentication as well. This is type of cryptographic algorithm where the keys can be deployed at post-
initialisation stage. The scheme can provide additional security in terms of authentication. 
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The use of Intrusion Detection and Prevention System commonly known as IPS and IDS, to protect 
mobile nodes against any malware or other types of active attacks could be implemented alongside the 
proposed scheme as future work (Botkar, S. and Chaudry, S. R. 2011). This would be to run IDS on 
each node to detect signature of the known attacks or anomaly detection system to look for any unusual 
behaviours. The combined use of trust based security and IDS schemes in MANET can be further 
explored as they are suitable for MANET environment (Al-Roubaiey et al 2010).  
 
As the security threat landscape is getting more advanced and complicated, a single security tool does 
not provide security against all types of threats. Depending on the type of applications and the 
conditions in which MANET is implemented, identifying the threat model will define what type of 
security measures need to be enforced (Johnson et al 2011). Therefore, it’s important to understand the 
threat landscape and devise a security plan and as referred to, within the security community, as 
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APPENDIX A: AODV 20 NODES TCL FILE 
 
Phy/WirelessPhy set freq_ 2.472e9    
Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_ 2.62861e-09; #100m radius  
Phy/WirelessPhy set CSThresh_ [expr 0.9*[Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_]]  
Phy/WirelessPhy set bandwidth_ 11.0e6   
Mac/802_11 set dataRate_ 11Mb     
Mac/802_11 set basicRate_ 2Mb        
  
set val(chan) Channel/WirelessChannel ;  
set val(prop) Propagation/TwoRayGround ;  
set val(netif) Phy/WirelessPhy ;  
set val(mac) Mac/802_11 ;  
set val(ifq) Queue/DropTail/PriQueue ;  
set val(ll) LL ;  
set val(ant) Antenna/OmniAntenna ;  
set val(ifqlen) 30 ;  
set val(nn) 20 ;  
set val(rp) AODV ;  
set val(x) 400 ;  
set val(y) 400 ;  
set val(stop) 100 ;  
set val(energymodel)    EnergyModel ;  
set val(initialenergy)    100 ;  
  
set ns_ [new Simulator]  
set tracefd [open AODV_20.tr w]  
  






set namtracefd [open namwrls.nam w]  
  
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd  
$ns_ use-newtrace  
  
$ns_ namtrace-all-wireless $namtracefd $val(x) $val(y)  
  
set topo [new Topography]  
$topo load_flatgrid $val(x) $val(y)  
  
create-god $val(nn)  
  
$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(rp) \  
                -llType $val(ll) \  
                -macType $val(mac) \  
                -ifqType $val(ifq) \  
                -ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \  
                -antType $val(ant) \  
                -propType $val(prop) \  
                -phyType $val(netif) \  
                -channelType $val(chan) \  
                -topoInstance $topo \  
                -agentTrace ON \  
                -routerTrace ON \  
                -macTrace OFF \  
                -movementTrace OFF \  
        -energyModel $val(energymodel) \  
        -initialEnergy $val(initialenergy) \  
        -rxPower 35.28e-3 \  






        -idlePower 712e-6 \  
        -sleepPower 144e-9   
  
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {  
    $ns_ node-config -initialEnergy [expr int(rand()*50)+50]   
    set node_($i) [$ns_ node]  
    $ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_($i) set ragent_] start_monitoring 55"  
    $ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_($i) set ragent_] num_nodes $val(nn)"  
 }  
  
# Adding malicious nodes  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(10) set ragent_] malicious"     
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(19) set ragent_] malicious"  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(1) set ragent_] malicious"  
#$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(8) set ragent_] malicious"  
  
#setting different initial energy levels for nodes  
#$ns_ node-config -initialEnergy expr {50+int(rand()*50)}  
#set node_(1) [$ns_ node]  
  
#$ns_ node-config -initialEnergy 60  
#set node_(2) [$ns_ node]  
  
#$ns_ node-config -initialEnergy 70  
#set node_(8) [$ns_ node]  
  
set god_ [God instance]  
  
source scen-20-test.tcl   







for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {  
 $ns_ initial_node_pos $node_($i) 10  
 }  
  
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {  
 $ns_ at $val(stop) "$node_($i) reset"  
}  
  
$ns_ at $val(stop) "stop"  
  
proc stop {} {  
global ns_ tracefd namtracefd  
$ns_ flush-trace  
close $tracefd  
close $namtracefd  
exec nam namwrls.nam &  














APPENDIX B: AODV 20 NODES CBR FILE 
# 
# nodes: 20, max conn: 4, send rate: 0.10000000000000001, seed: 1 
# 
# 
# 1 connecting to 2 at time 2.5568388786897245 
# 
set udp_(0) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(6) $udp_(0) 
set null_(0) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(19) $null_(0) 
set cbr_(0) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(0) set packetSize_ 512   
$cbr_(0) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(0) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(0) set maxpkts_ 10000                 
$cbr_(0) attach-agent $udp_(0) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(0) $null_(0) 
$ns_ at 2.5568388786897245 "$cbr_(0) start" 
# 
# 4 connecting to 5 at time 56.333118917575632 
# 
set udp_(1) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(14) $udp_(1) 
set null_(1) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(9) $null_(1) 
set cbr_(1) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(1) set packetSize_ 512 






$cbr_(1) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(1) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(1) attach-agent $udp_(1) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(1) $null_(1) 
$ns_ at 10.333118917575632 "$cbr_(1) start" 
# 
# 4 connecting to 6 at time 146.96568928983328 
# 
set udp_(2) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(2) $udp_(2) 
set null_(2) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(17) $null_(2) 
set cbr_(2) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(2) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(2) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(2) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(2) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(2) attach-agent $udp_(2) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(2) $null_(2) 
$ns_ at 20.96568928983328 "$cbr_(2) start" 
# 
# 6 connecting to 7 at time 55.634230382570173 
# 
set udp_(3) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(15) $udp_(3) 
set null_(3) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(18) $null_(3) 
set cbr_(3) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(3) set packetSize_ 512 






$cbr_(3) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(3) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(3) attach-agent $udp_(3) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(3) $null_(3) 
$ns_ at 55.634230382570173 "$cbr_(3) start" 
# 



























APPENDIX C: AODV 50 NODES TCL FILE 
 
Phy/WirelessPhy set freq_ 2.472e9    
Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_ 2.62861e-09; #100m radius  
Phy/WirelessPhy set CSThresh_ [expr 0.9*[Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_]]  
Phy/WirelessPhy set bandwidth_ 11.0e6   
Mac/802_11 set dataRate_ 11Mb   
Mac/802_11 set basicRate_ 2Mb   
  
set val(chan) Channel/WirelessChannel ;  
set val(prop) Propagation/TwoRayGround ;  
set val(netif) Phy/WirelessPhy ;  
set val(mac) Mac/802_11 ;  
set val(ifq) Queue/DropTail/PriQueue ;  
set val(ll) LL ;  
set val(ant) Antenna/OmniAntenna ;  
set val(ifqlen) 30 ;  
set val(nn) 50 ;  
set val(rp) AODV ;  
set val(x) 400 ;  
set val(y) 400 ;  
set val(stop) 100 ;  
set val(energymodel)    EnergyModel ;  
set val(initialenergy)    100 ;  
  
set ns_ [new Simulator]  
  







set winFile [open CwMaodv_50 w]  
  
set namtracefd [open namwrls.nam w]  
  
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd  
$ns_ use-newtrace  
  
$ns_ namtrace-all-wireless $namtracefd $val(x) $val(y)  
  
set topo [new Topography]  
$topo load_flatgrid $val(x) $val(y)  
  
create-god $val(nn)  
  
  
$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(rp) \  
                -llType $val(ll) \  
                -macType $val(mac) \  
                -ifqType $val(ifq) \  
                -ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \  
                -antType $val(ant) \  
                -propType $val(prop) \  
                -phyType $val(netif) \  
                -channelType $val(chan) \  
                -topoInstance $topo \  
                -agentTrace ON \  
                -routerTrace ON \  
                -macTrace OFF \  
                -movementTrace OFF \  






        -initialEnergy $val(initialenergy) \  
        -rxPower 35.28e-3 \  
        -txPower 31.32e-3 \  
        -idlePower 712e-6 \  
        -sleepPower 144e-9   
  
 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {  
    $ns_ node-config -initialEnergy [expr int(rand()*50)+50]   
    set node_($i) [$ns_ node]  
    $ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_($i) set ragent_] start_monitoring 60"  
    $ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_($i) set ragent_] num_nodes $val(nn)"  
 }  
  
# Adding malicious nodes  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(15) set ragent_] malicious"  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(25) set ragent_] malicious"  
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(35) set ragent_] malicious"  
  
   
set god_ [God instance]  
  
source scen-50-1-test.tcl   
source cbr-50-5-10.tcl  
  
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {  
 $ns_ initial_node_pos $node_($i) 10  
 }  
  






 $ns_ at $val(stop) "$node_($i) reset"  
}  
  
$ns_ at $val(stop) "stop"  
  
proc stop {} {  
global ns_ tracefd namtracefd  
$ns_ flush-trace  
close $tracefd  
close $namtracefd  
exec nam namwrls.nam &  






















APPENDIX D: AODV 50 NODES CBR FILE 
# 
# nodes: 50, max conn: 5, send rate: 0.10000000000000001, seed: 1 
# 
# 
# 1 connecting to 2 at time 2.5568388786897245 
# 
set udp_(0) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(23) $udp_(0) 
set null_(0) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(25) $null_(0) 
set cbr_(0) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(0) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(0) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(0) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(0) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(0) attach-agent $udp_(0) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(0) $null_(0) 
$ns_ at 2.5568388786897245 "$cbr_(0) start" 
# 







set udp_(1) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(4) $udp_(1) 
set null_(1) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(5) $null_(1) 
set cbr_(1) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(1) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(1) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(1) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(1) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(1) attach-agent $udp_(1) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(1) $null_(1) 
$ns_ at 56.333118917575632 "$cbr_(1) start" 
# 
# 4 connecting to 6 at time 146.96568928983328 
# 
set udp_(2) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(4) $udp_(2) 
set null_(2) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(6) $null_(2) 
set cbr_(2) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(2) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(2) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 






$cbr_(2) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(2) attach-agent $udp_(2) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(2) $null_(2) 
$ns_ at 46.96568928983328 "$cbr_(2) start" 
# 
# 6 connecting to 7 at time 55.634230382570173 
# 
set udp_(3) [new Agent/UDP] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(6) $udp_(3) 
set null_(3) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(7) $null_(3) 
set cbr_(3) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(3) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(3) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(3) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(3) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(3) attach-agent $udp_(3) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(3) $null_(3) 
$ns_ at 55.634230382570173 "$cbr_(3) start" 
# 
# 7 connecting to 8 at time 29.546173154165118 
# 






$ns_ attach-agent $node_(29) $udp_(4) 
set null_(4) [new Agent/Null] 
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(27) $null_(4) 
set cbr_(4) [new Application/Traffic/CBR] 
$cbr_(4) set packetSize_ 512 
$cbr_(4) set interval_ 0.01000000000000001 
$cbr_(4) set random_ 1 
$cbr_(4) set maxpkts_ 10000 
$cbr_(4) attach-agent $udp_(4) 
$ns_ connect $udp_(4) $null_(4) 
$ns_ at 29.546173154165118 "$cbr_(4) start" 
 
# 















APPENDIX E: SOURCE CODE 
Send Trust Request  
void 
AODV::sendTrustRequest(nsaddr_t dst) { 
// Allocate a TREQ packet  
Packet *p = Packet::alloc(); 
struct hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
struct hdr_ip *ih = HDR_IP(p); 
struct hdr_aodv_request *rq = HDR_AODV_REQUEST(p); 
aodv_rt_entry *rt = rtable.rt_lookup(dst); 
assert(rt); 
 
 // Fill out the RREQ packet  
 // ch->uid() = 0; 
 ch->ptype() = PT_AODV; 
 ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + rq->size(); 
 ch->iface() = -2; 
 ch->error() = 0; 
 ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_NONE; 







 ih->saddr() = index; 
 ih->daddr() = IP_BROADCAST; 
 ih->sport() = RT_PORT; 
 ih->dport() = RT_PORT; 
 
 // Fill up some more fields.  
 rq->rq_type = AODVTYPE_TREQ;  //  The type of packet is defined here,  that is Trust Request 
 rq->rq_hop_count = 1; 
 rq->rq_bcast_id = bid++; 
 rq->rq_dst = dst; 
 rq->rq_dst_seqno = (rt ? rt->rt_seqno : 0); 
 rq->rq_src = index; 
 seqno += 2; 
 assert ((seqno%2) == 0); 
 rq->rq_src_seqno = seqno; 
 rq->rq_timestamp = CURRENT_TIME; 
 











Send Trust Reply 
void 
AODV::sendTrustReply(nsaddr_t ipdst, u_int32_t hop_count, nsaddr_t rpdst, 
                u_int32_t rpseq, u_int32_t lifetime, double timestamp, int dest_id) { 
Packet *p = Packet::alloc(); 
struct hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
struct hdr_ip *ih = HDR_IP(p); 
struct hdr_aodv_reply *rp = HDR_AODV_REPLY(p); 
aodv_rt_entry *rt = rtable.rt_lookup(ipdst); 
#ifdef DEBUG 
fprintf(stderr, "sending Reply from %d at %.2f\n", index, Scheduler::instance().clock()); 
#endif // DEBUG 
 assert(rt); 
 rp->rp_type = AODVTYPE_TREP; // The type of packet is defined here,  that is Trust Reply 
 //rp->rp_flags = 0x00; 
 rp->rp_hop_count = hop_count; 
 rp->rp_dst = rpdst; 
 rp->rp_dst_seqno = rpseq; 
 rp->rp_src = index; 
 rp->rp_lifetime = lifetime; 






 // trust value  
 printf ("Trust value of [%d] for [%d] .... is [%.2f] \n", index, dest_id, trustTable[index][dest_id]); 
 rp->node_trust = trustTable[index][dest_id]; 
    
 // ch->uid() = 0; 
 ch->ptype() = PT_AODV; 
 ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + rp->size(); 
 ch->iface() = -2; 
 ch->error() = 0; 
 ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_INET; 
 //printf("Here........11\n");  
 ch->next_hop_ = rt->rt_nexthop; 
 //printf("Here........22\n");  
 ch->prev_hop_ = index;          // AODV hack 
 ch->direction() = hdr_cmn::DOWN; 
 ih->saddr() = index; 
 ih->daddr() = ipdst; 
 ih->sport() = RT_PORT; 
 ih->dport() = RT_PORT; 
 ih->ttl_ = NETWORK_DIAMETER; 






Send Hello   
* 




Packet *p = Packet::alloc(); 
struct hdr_cmn *ch = HDR_CMN(p); 
struct hdr_ip *ih = HDR_IP(p); 
struct hdr_aodv_reply *rh = HDR_AODV_REPLY(p); 
iNode = (MobileNode *) (Node::get_node_by_address(index)); 
iEnergy = iNode->energy_model()->energy(); 
node_speed = iNode->speed(); 
two_hop_nbr = 0; 
std::map<nsaddr_t, int>::iterator it = nbr_2hops.begin(); 
while (it != nbr_2hops.end() ){ 
 //    printf ("Neighbor Node [%d].... having Num of Nbrs [%d] \n", it->first, it->second); 
        two_hop_nbr += it->second; 
        it++;         








fprintf(stderr, "sending Hello from %d at %.2f\n", index, Scheduler::instance().clock()); 
#endif // DEBUG 
 
 rh->rp_type = AODVTYPE_HELLO; 
 //rh->rp_flags = 0x00; 
 rh->rp_hop_count = 1; 
 rh->rp_dst = index; 
 rh->rp_dst_seqno = seqno; 
 rh->rp_lifetime = (1 + ALLOWED_HELLO_LOSS) * HELLO_INTERVAL; 
 // my header data 
 rh->num_nbr = num_nbr; 
 rh->node_trust = total_avg_trust;  
 rh->nbr_Energy = iEnergy; 
 rh->nbr_Speed = node_speed; 
 rh->nbr_2hop_nbrs = two_hop_nbr; 
 strcpy (rh->trust_vector, aodv_trust_vector); 
 // ch->uid() = 0; 
 ch->ptype() = PT_AODV; 
 ch->size() = IP_HDR_LEN + rh->size(); 






 ch->error() = 0; 
 ch->addr_type() = NS_AF_NONE; 
 ch->prev_hop_ = index;          // AODV hack 
 
 ih->saddr() = index; 
 ih->daddr() = IP_BROADCAST; 
 ih->sport() = RT_PORT; 
 ih->dport() = RT_PORT; 
 ih->ttl_ = 1; 
 
 Scheduler::instance().schedule(target_, p, 0.0); 
 
} 
// Some code omitted for brevity  
 
